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THE  RECESSION  of  1973-75 was the most severe  economic  contraction 
in the postwar  era.  By the  first  quarter  of 1975, real  gross  national  product 
had declined  nearly  7 percent  from  its 1973 peak, about  twice  the decline 
in real GNP from peak to trough  in 1957-58, the most severe previous 
postwar  recession.  Why  was the  recent  recession  so severe?  What  were  the 
forces  behind  this  sharp  drop  in aggregate  demand? 
One salient  feature  of the 1973-75 period was the unusually  unfav- 
orable  shift  in the balance-sheet  position  of American  households.  Recent 
theoretical  and empirical  research  on the "life cycle" and "liquidity" 
hypotheses-both  of  which stress the importance  of  the consumer's 
balance-sheet  position  to consumer  expenditure  decisions'-suggests that 
this  might  be an  important  contributor  to the  severity  of the  recession. 
Note:  I thank Jeff Perloff for encouraging me to pursue this line of  research. 
Peter Temin and members of the Brookings  panel provided useful comments, while 
Dave Modest was helpful in getting the MPS model up on the computer.  The simula- 
tion results were generated  using the Troll System, to which the National Bureau of 
Economic Research generously granted me access. Further research support has 
been provided by the Social Science Division Research Fund of the University of 
Chicago and the Social Science Research Council. 
1. See Franco Modigliani, "Monetary Policy and Consumption: Linkages via 
Interest Rate and Wealth Effects in the FMP Model," in Consumer Spending anld 
Monetary Policy: The Linkages, Proceedings of a Monetary Conference (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, 1971),  pp. 9-84;  Frederic S. Mishkin, "Illiquidity,  Con- 
sumer Durable Expenditure, and Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, 
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Several  issues arise in considering  the possible effects of changes  in 
household  balance  sheets  on the economy.  Does the timing  of the changes 
indicate  a causal  effect  on aggregate  demand?  Do estimated  expenditure 
models for particular  components  of GNP that incorporate  household 
balance-sheet  effects  explain  the movements  in the expenditure  series  for 
the 1973-75 period?  How large  might  the effects  of balance-sheet  changes 
on aggregate  demand  have been in this recession?  What role did the 
1973-74 decline  in the stock  market  play? 
This paper is an attempt  to answer these questions.  Because other 
developments  in the economy  influence  it, the balance sheet of Ameri- 
can households  must be viewed as endogenous.  This paper is thus not 
intended  to promote  the view that balance-sheet  changes  "caused"  the 
recession  to be more  severe  than  it otherwise  would  have been. Rather,  it 
is an attempt  to isolate the mechanisms  through  which restrictive  policy 
and  other  events  may  have  operated  on the economy  during  1973-75, and 
to improve  the structural  explanation  of the cyclical movements  of this 
period. 
Overview  of the  Household  Balance  Sheet:  1972-75 
In the absence  of money illusion, the consumer  would be concerned 
with  his balance-sheet  position  in terms  of the goods and  services  he could 
buy, and  thus  balance-sheet  items  that  are  deflated  to real terms  should  be 
most relevant  to consumer  spending  decisions.2  As pictured  in figure 1, 
which depicts  the aggregate  balance  sheet of all American  households  in 
the 1972-75 period (1958 prices), household  financial  positions  did un- 
dergo  major  shifts  at critical  points  in the  business  cycle  of this  period. 
Throughout  1972, the consumer's  financial  position  improved  steadily, 
and  consumer  expenditure  was  buoyant.  Real net worth  increased  in every 
vol. 66 (September 1976), pp. 642-54; J. R. Kearl and Frederic S. Mishkin, "Illi- 
quidity, the Demand for Residential Housing, and Monetary Policy," Journal of 
Finance (forthcoming). 
2. Throughout this paper real quantities are denoted in 1958 dollars. Also, be- 
cause the recent revisions of the national income accounts are not compatible with 
the estimated equations from past work on the liquidity hypothesis or with the cur- 
rently available version of the MIT-Penn-Social  Science Research Council model, 
the unrevised data (which are described  in the appendix) are used in the regressions 
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Figure  1. Selected  Components  of the U.S. Household  Balance  Sheet, 
Beginning  of Quarter,  1972-75 
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Source:  Data  supplied  by the  Board  of  Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve  System  (described  in "Quarterly 
Econometric  Model  Data  Directory,  January  1975"-  MIT-Penn-SSRC-  processed);  deflated  by  the  im- 
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quarter,  while the rise in household  liabilities  was matched  by that  in the 
real  value  of household  financial  assets.  This favorable  trend  was reversed 
by the bear market  in common  stocks starting  in early 1973. While the 
consumer  built  up his liabilities  to finance  the booming  purchases  of con- 
sumer  durables  and  housing,  the drop  in security  prices  led to a continuing 
decline  in the real value  of his financial  assets  and  net worth.  The house- 
hold balance-sheet  position  deteriorated.  This was followed  by a decline 
in real consumer  spending  which  helped initiate  the recession  starting  in 
the  fourth  quarter  of 1973. 
By the end of 1974, consumer  spending  had collapsed,  with the econ- 
omy experiencing  rates of personal  saving that were virtually  unprece- 
dented  in the postwar  years.  The bear  market  in common  stocks  had con- 
tinued  throughout  1974, causing  a particularly  acute  deterioration  in the 
aggregate  financial  position of households  by the end of the year. Real 
holdings  of financial  assets  and real net worth  had shrunk  22 and 10 per- 
cent,  respectively-the largest  declines  in the  postwar  period-whereas on 
average  real  financial  assets  and  net worth  grew  at an annual  rate  of 3 to 5 
percent  in the  postwar  period. 
Consumer  spending  picked up and the economy  began to recover  in 
1975 as the aggregate  household  financial  position took a turn for the 
better.  Security  prices  advanced,  and  the real  value of household  financial 
assets  and  and  real  net worth  began  to rise  from  the low point  at the begin- 
ning  of the fourth  quarter  of 1974. A decline  in the real  burden  of house- 
hold indebtedness  from the 1973:4 peak value enhanced  this favorable 
trend. 
The developments  in the business  cycle in 1973-75 and the changes  in 
the balance-sheet  position of American  households  suggest  more than a 
coincidental  relationship.  The next sections will present evidence of a 
structural  link  between  changes  in household  balance  sheets  and  aggregate 
demand,  and will provide  quantitative  estimates  of how important  these 
balance-sheet  shifts were to the changes in aggregate  demand in the 
1973-75 recession.3 
3. The  1973-75  recession is not the only period in which household balance 
sheets underwent  major fluctuations,  and thus could have had a significant  impact on 
the business cycle. For an analysis of  household balance-sheet effects during the 
Great Depression, see Frederic S. Mishkin, "The Household Balance-sheet and the 
Great Depression," Report 7639 (University of Chicago, Center for Mathematical 
Studies in Business and Economics, October 1976; processed). Frederic S. Mishkin  127 
Models  of the  Effects  of Household  Balance  Sheets 
Two basic approaches  to consumer  behavior  postulate  that changes  in 
the household balance sheet affect consumer  spending decisions. The 
"life-cycle  hypothesis  of saving"4  of Modigliani-Brumberg  and Ando- 
Modigliani  concentrates  on the consumer's  consumption  decisions  (mostly 
with regard  to nondurable  goods and services), while the "liquidity"  hy- 
pothesis,5  which I have advanced  elsewhere,  centers  on the consumer's 
decision  to acquire  tangible  assets  such as consumer  durables  or housing. 
THE  LIFE-CYCLE  HYPOTHESIS 
In the life-cycle hypothesis,  the consumer  considers  his lifetime re- 
sources in making  consumption  decisions.  Individual  consumption  thus 
depends  on the  resources  available  to the consumer  (his net worth  plus  the 
present  value  of his current  and  anticipated  labor  income-analogous to a 
permanent  labor income concept), his age, and the rate of return on 
capital.  In Modigliani's  recent  work, aggregation  over all individuals  in 
the economy  leads  to a consumption  function  in which  total consumption, 
which includes  expenditures  on nondurable  goods and services  plus the 
rental  value of the stock of consumer  durables,  is a function  of current 
and  past  income6  and  total  net  wealth. 
4.  See Franco Modigliani and Richard  Brumberg,  "Utility Analysis and the Con- 
sumption Function: An Interpretation  of Cross-Section  Data," in Kenneth K. Kuri- 
hara, ed., Post Keynesian Economics (Rutgers  University Press, 1954), pp. 388-436; 
Modigliani, "Monetary Policy and Consumption";  and Albert Ando and Franco 
Modigliani, "The 'Life Cycle' Hypothesis of  Saving: Aggregate Implications and 
Tests," Ameerican  Economic Review, vol. 53 (March 1963, pt. 1), pp. 55-84. 
5.  See  Mishkin, "Illiquidity, Consumer Durable Expenditure, and  Monetary 
Policy." 
6. The recent work of  Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric Policy Evaluation: 
A Critique,"  in Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, eds., The Phillips Curve and 
Labor Markets,  Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series on Public Policy, vol. 1 (Am- 
sterdam: North-Holland, 1976), pp. 19-46, and empirical work by Robert E. Hall, 
"The Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis and the Role of Consumption in 
Aggregate Economic Activity" (Massachusetts  Institute of Technology, Department 
of Economics, January 1977; processed) and by John F. 0.  Bilson and James E. 
Glassman,  "A Consumption  Function with Rational  Forecasts of Permanent  Income" 
(Northwestern University, April 1977; processed), show that using a fixed lagged 
structure on income to estimate permanent or expected income may prove to be 
misleading at times. Care must thus be taken in using the fixed lag coefficients to 
evaluate the response of the economy to tax changes. The same issue arises in the 
report by Franco Modigliani and Charles Steindel in this issue. 128  Brookings PaDers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
(1)  CON  fM(B(L) YND,  N )N 
where 
CON =  real consumption 
YD =  real disposable income 
W =  real household net worth 
B(L)  =  lag operator 
N =  population. 
An important  component  of the net-worth  measure  is household  hold- 
ings  of common  stock.  Capital  gains  or losses  on these  holdings  may  not be 
considered  fully  part  of financial  assets  until  they are realized.  Movement 
in prices  of common  stock,  which  lead to unrealized  capital  gains  or losses 
in the short  run, should  thus not have their  full impact  immediately.  To 
reflect  this, the net-wealth  variable  in equation  1 can be broken  up into 
its stock and nonstock components,  and household  stock holdings can 
enter  the equation  with  a distributed  lag.7 
The best-known  empirical  application  of the life-cycle consumption 
function  is that  of the MIT-Penn-Social  Science  Research  Council  (MPS) 
model of the United  States.  The MPS consumption  equation  relates  real 
per capita consumption,  CON/N  (again, 1958 dollars), to a twelve- 
quarter  distributed  lag on per capita real disposable  income, YD/N, 
household  real  net worth  per capita  exclusive  of corporate  common  stock, 
(W -  STK)  /N, and  an eight-quarter  distributed  lag on the per  capita  real 
value of household  holdings  of common stock, STK/N. An additional 
constraint  is imposed on the estimated equation: nonstock wealth is 
viewed as having the same long-run  impact on consumption  as stock 
wealth,  and thus  the coefficient  on nonstock  wealth  is forced  to equal  the 
sum  of the  lag coefficients  on stock  holdings.8 
7. The rationalization  behind the distributed  lag on stock-market  wealth is some- 
what arbitrary.  Other possible rationalizations:  consumers  are slow to adjust  to new 
information because of costs in adjusting  their behavior, or they may view many 
changes in stock prices as temporary and thus will respond only to changes that 
persist. 
Although the nonstock component of net wealth also has some accrued capital 
gains and losses, these are far less important  to fluctuations  in net wealth than are 
unrealized capital gains or losses on stock. This is the reason for the split between 
the stock and nonstock components of net wealth. 
8.  See the  1975 version of  the MPS model, found in "Equations in the MIT- 
Penn-SSRC Econometric Model of the United States" (January 1975; processed). Frederic S. Mishkin  129 
For purposes  of this  paper,  this equation  has been reestimated  over  the 
period  1954:1 to 1972:4 using  instrumental  variables  with  a correction  for 
first-order  serial  correlation  to produce  consistent  estimates,  free of simul- 
taneous-equations  bias.9  As in the MPS  equation,  the distributed  lags  have 
been estimated  with the lag coefficients  constrained  to lie on a second- 
degree  polynomial,  with a constrained  endpoint,  and the equality  of the 
long-run  stock  and  nonstock  coefficients  has been  imposed.  Slightly  better 
results  were  obtained  when  the distributed  lag on stock  holdings  was taken 
to be seven  quarters  long rather  than  eight  quarters,  as in the MPS  model, 
and the results  with the seven-quarter  lag are presented  here. The reesti- 
mated  consumption  equation,  with asymptotic  t statistics  in parentheses 
and the coefficient  on u-l equalling  the first-order  serial-correlation  co- 
efficient,  appears  below.'0 
(2)  CON  1  IYD\  W-STK\ 
)N  =E  b  KN-)i  +  0.056  K  ) 
+  ci (O  N  i_j  +  0.738u_1. 
11  6 
E  b  =  0.659  E  ci  =  0.056. 
i=O  (17.6)  i=O  (7.0) 
RI  =  0.9994;  Durbin-Watson  =  2.03; standard error  =  0.007249. 
Equation  2, whose parameters  are very similar  to those of the con- 
sumption  equation  most recently  estimated  for the MPS model," lends 
strong  support  to the view that changes  in the household  balance sheet 
have potent effects on consumption  demand.  The net-worth  items enter 
very  significantly  in this regression;  the sum  of the lag coefficients  (which 
9.  All  the right-hand variables are taken to be endogenous. The list of instru- 
ments is as follows: the discount rate, unborrowed  reserves  plus currency  outside of 
banks, exports, federal government  expenditures,  the personal income tax rate, these 
five variables  lagged one period, the constant  term, and population. 
The estimation method developed by Ray C. Fair, "The Estimation of Simulta- 
neous Equation Models with Lagged Endogenous  Variables and First Order  Serially 
Correlated  Errors,"  Econometrica, vol. 38 (May 1970), pp. 507-16,  has been used 
here with the appropriate  additional instruments. 
10. The lags on disposable income are as follows:  0.085, 0.082, 0.078, 0.074, 
0.069, 0.063, 0.056, 0.048, 0.040, 0.031, 0.022, 0.011. The lags on holdings of com- 
mon stock are: 0.017, 0.013, 0.010, 0.007, 0.005, 0.003, 0.001. 
11. See Barry Bosworth, "The Stock Market  and the Economy,"  BPEA, 2:1975, 
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is also equal  to the coefficient  on non-stock-market  assets) has an asymp- 
totic t statistic of 7. The equation  indicates  that net-wealth  effects on 
consumption  can indeed  be sizable;  a decline  of $1 of net worth  leads to 
a fall of 5  1/2 ? in consumption. 
THE  LIQUIDITY  HYPOTHESIS 
In the work on the life-cycle  hypothesis  and in most other studies  of 
wealth  effects,  the household  portfolio  is viewed  as a homogeneous  aggre- 
gate. The liquidity hypothesis differs in that it stresses the composition  of 
the household  balance  sheet, in particular  distinguishing  between  effects 
from  consumer's  financial  assets  and  liabilities.'2  Thus  household  liabilities 
are  not netted  out against  other  consumer  assets  in studying  the impact  of 
changes  in household  balance  sheets  on aggregate  demand. 
The liquidity  hypothesis  concentrates  on the imperfect  capital  markets 
that cause certain  tangible  consumer  assets, housing  and consumer  dur- 
ables,  to be highly  illiquid;  that  is, the consumer  incurs  some loss when  he 
tries  to sell them (or to borrow  against  them) to raise cash, especially  in 
an emergency.'3  A consumer  who suffers  financial  distress  when  he cannot 
readily  pay his bills would prefer  holding highly liquid financial  assets 
rather  than  such  illiquid  tangible  assets.  In effect,  the opportunity  cost of 
holding  consumer  durables  or housing  increases  substantially  when  a con- 
sumer  gets into financial  trouble.  As the probability  of financial  distress 
increases,  he will  lower  his demand  for tangible  assets. 
The probability  of suffering  financial  distress  is affected  by the com- 
position  of the consumer's  balance  sheet. When  indebtedness  is high, the 
consumer  has large contractual  payments  for debt service,  and possibly 
other  financial  obligations,  that  increase  the  likelihood  of financial  distress, 
thus decreasing  the demand  for tangi.ble  assets. When the value of his 
financial  assets  falls, the consumer  is again  more  likely to suffer  financial 
distress  since  his buffer  against  bad times  has now diminished;  this would 
also  diminish  the  demand  for  tangible  assets. 
This analysis  suggests  that  the consumer's  desired  holdings  of durables 
and housing  will be positively  related  to his initial holdings  of financial 
12. See  Mishkin, "Illiquidity, Consumer Durable Expenditure, and Monetary 
Policy," for a more formal and detailed exposition. 
13. Some  intangible assets also  have the illiquidity characteristic of  tangible 
assets. Some types of term insurance  would clearly fall into this category. Frederic S. Mishkin  131 
assets and negatively  related  to his liabilities.14  An increase  in indebted- 
ness and a drop  in holdings  of financial  assets,  such as occurred  in 1973, 
would raise the probability  of financial distress, thus prompting  the 
consumer  to shift  his  demand  away  from  durables  and  housing.'5 
The timing and duration  of these effects are important  issues. The 
effects  from household  balance  sheets described  above, as well as those 
operating  through  the life-cycle  model,  should  be only  temporary  because 
consumers  will adjust  their  portfolios  to bring  liabilities  and  assets  to their 
desired  levels over  time;  in equilibrium,  liabilities  and  financial  assets  will 
be endogenously  determined  by the consumer  along  with  the desired  level 
of tangible  assets and savings.  Even so, these temporary  effects may be 
extremely  important  when  households  are forced  away  from  their  desired 
portfolio  positions  by events  outside  of their  control (such as movements 
in common  stock prices,  in income, in the general  price level, in interest 
rates,  and  so on). 
In two previous  papers, consumer-durable  and housing models that 
accord  with  the "liquidity"  hypothesis  have  been  estimated  using  data  from 
postwar  aggregate  time series through  the end of  1972.16 Housing and 
consumer  durables  are viewed  as assets  that yield a return  in the form of 
consumption  services;  the consumer  derives  benefits  from the services  of 
the stock,  not from  the flow of durable  purchases.  The consumer  thus  has 
a desired stock of these tangible  assets that is a function of the usual 
variables found in  the  literature-permanent income  and  a  Hall- 
Jorgenson  rental  cost of capital.'7  The liquidity  hypothesis  indicates  that, 
in addition,  the desired  stock of tangible  assets is a function  of the con- 
14. The liquidity hypothesis also implies that the desired level of tangible assets 
is positively related to expected average (permanent) income and is negatively re- 
lated to the consumer's perceptions of income variance. These results are not dis- 
cussed here because they are not of central concern. 
15. Usually, increases in debt are considered to be an indicator of  consumer 
optimism and strong demand, yet the liquidity  hypothesis indicates that a buildup of 
consumer indebtedness  eventually proves to be a deterrent  to future expenditure  for 
tangible assets. This does not imply a contradiction;  a rise in the stock of consumers' 
durable  capital resulting  from increased  expenditure  on consumer  durables  will deter 
future purchases  of this type although the increased  expenditure  indicates consumer 
optimism  as well. 
16. Mishkin,  "Illiquidity,  Consumer  Durable Expenditure,  and Monetary  Policy"; 
and Kearl and Mishkin,  "Illiquidity." 
17. Robert E. Hall and Dale  W. Jorgenson, "Tax Policy and Investment Be- 
havior,"  American  Economic Review, vol. 57 (June 1967), pp. 391-414. 132  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
sumer's  debt  and  financial  assets  at the beginning  of the period.  Therefore, 
(3)  K* = f(Yp,  CAPC, DEBT, FIN)  +  EA, 
where,  as  further  elaborated  in the appendix, 
K* = desired  stock  of real  tangible  assets 
Yp = expected  real average  (permanent)  income, calculated  as a 
fixed-weight  distributed  lag on past  disposable  income18 
CAPC = rental cost of capital'9 =  (R +  D) (P/PCON) 
R = interest  rate =  Aaa corporate  bond rate for durables  and 
mortgage  rate  for  housing 
D=  annual  depreciation  rate20 
P = implicit  price deflator  for the tangible  asset =  the implicit 
price  deflator  for consumer  durables  (PCD) for the durable- 
goods  equation  and  the  Census  price  deflator  for single-family 
houses (PH) for  the housing  equation 
18. The series on permanent  income has been constructed  with a procedure  out- 
lined by Michael R. Darby, "The Allocation of  Transitory Income Among Con- 
sumers'  Assets,"  American  Economic Review, vol. 62 (December 1972), pp. 939-40. 
The formula  for calculating  permanent  income is: 
yp-  ,  wiYD-i, 
i=o 
where YD =  disposable  income and 
wi  =  y[(l  +  8)  U1-y)Ft, 
where y = quarterly  adjustment  rate = 0.1, and ,  = quarterly  growth rate of dispos- 
able income = approximately 0.01. For example, calculations of the first four lag 
coefficients  are: 0.100, 0.091, 0.083, and 0.075. 
19. The rental cost of capital used here is completely analogous to the rental cost 
of capital  in the investment  study of Hall and Jorgenson,  "Tax Policy and Investment 
Behavior,"  and in Robert Hall's paper in this issue. The interest rate in the formula 
above is a nominal interest rate, not a real interest rate as would be appropriate  in 
the Hall-Jorgenson  formulation. Attempts were made to estimate the effect of infla- 
tion and include it in the model, yet experiments  with varied distributed  lags of past 
inflation proved fruitless: no significant  effects could be obtained. On the one hand, 
with constant nominal interest rates, inflation lowers the rental cost of capital and 
encourages  expenditures.  On the other hand, evidence from consumer surveys indi- 
cates that inflation increases consumer perceptions of uncertainty (see F. Thomas 
Juster  and Paul Wachtel, "Inflation  and the Consumer,"  BPEA, 1:1972, pp. 71-114), 
and this might have a depressing  effect on purchases of tangible assets. J. R. Kearl 
also discusses why inflation might decrease housing purchases in "Inflation-Induced 
Distortions  in the Real Economy: An Econometric  and Simulation  Study of Housing 
and Mortgage Innovation" (Ph.D.  dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of  Tech- 
nology, 1975). 
20. The annual depreciation  rate used for consumer durables  was 0.20, while the 
rate used for single-family  housing was 0.02. Frederic S. Mishkin  133 
PCON =  implicit  price  deflator  for total  consumption 
DEBT  =  real  household  liabilities,  beginning  of quarter21 
FIN =  real gross holdings  of financial  assets by households,  begin- 
ning of quarter (includes demand  deposits plus currency, 
time and savings  deposits,  bonds, corporate  common  stock, 
life  insurance, pension funds,  and  other miscellaneous 
assets)22 
EA  =  additive  error  term. 
Since  a change  in the rental  cost of capital  would  be expected  to have a 
larger  absolute  impact on the desired  stock of the tangible  asset when 
permanent  income, and hence the desired  stock, is high, the capital-cost 
measure  is scaled  by permanent  income  in linearizing  equation  3: 
(4)  K* =  a +  (b +  c CAPC)Yp +  d DEBT +  e FIN +  EA. 
Expenditure  is modeled using a stock-adjustment  framework  which 
views consumers  as adjusting  to their desired stock only slowly. The 
change  in the stock (that is, net investment)  is only a fraction,  X, of the 
gap between  the desired  and actual  stock at the beginning  of the period. 
Therefore, 
(5)  (K-  K1)  -  X(K*  -  K1)  +  EB, 
where 
K =  real  stock  of the  tangible  assets,  end  of quarter 
X =  the quarterly  adjustment  rate 
EB =  additive error  term, 
and  the numerical  subscripts  refer  to the time  period  of the K variable. 
Expenditures,  or equivalently  gross investment,  equals  the sum of net 
investment  and  replacement.  Assuming  a quarterly  replacement  rate  of 8, 
(6)  EXP/4  =  3K_1  +  (K -  K1) 
where  EXP is real  expenditures  at an annual  rate.  Combining  equations  3 
through  6, 
(7)  EXP  =  4Xa +  (4)b +  4Xc CAPC)  Yp +  4Xd  DEBT +  4Xe  FIN 
+  4(3 -  X)K.1 +  u, 
where  u is an additive  error  term,  which  equals  4 (XEA  + EB). 
21. For housing, mortgage liabilities have been excluded from this measure. See 
Kearl and Mishkin,  "Illiquidity,"  for an explanation. 
22. For housing, equity in housing has been added to this measure. See ibid. 134  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
The signs of all the coefficients  of equation  7 are theoretically  deter- 
mined. The coefficient  of permanent  income should  be positive  because 
increased  permanent  income  encourages  expenditure  on tangible  assets. 
A higher  rental  cost of capital  should  discourage  expenditure;  this implies 
that 4Xc  is negative.  The coefficient  on the lagged  stock  term  will be nega- 
tive in the usual case in which  the speed of adjustment  is higher  than  the 
replacement  rate. 
The illiquidity  of tangible  assets should lead to a positive  FIN coeffi- 
cient and a negative  DEBT coefficient.  Although  the liquidity  model does 
not imply  that,  for an individual,  the debt  coefficient  should  be markedly 
larger in absolute  value than the financial-assets  coefficient,  this result 
might  be expected  in aggregate  time-series  estimates.  Changes  in the value 
of financial  assets should have a smaller  impact on expenditure  of the 
wealthy,  for whom  liquidity  is not a problem,  than  of the middle-  or lower- 
income  groups.  For this reason,  the unequal  and highly  skewed  distribu- 
tion of financial  assets in this country  would tend to lower sharply  the 
financial-assets  coefficient  in a model estimated  on data from aggregate 
time-series.  On the other hand, consumer-debt  liabilities  are distributed 
far more  equally  than  financial  assets;  thus  the coefficient  on debt should 
have  a high  value  in time-series  estimations. 
In addition,  the estimated  debt  coefficient  in equation  7 probably  over- 
states the actual  impact  on expenditure  from measured  household  liabil- 
ities. The theory  behind  the liquidity  hypothesis  indicates  that any con- 
sumer  obligation  that  requires  a commitment  to pay in the future,  whether 
or not it is classified  as a household  liability,  will deter expenditure  on 
tangible  assets.  Consumer  obligations  excluded  from  household  liabilities 
-lease  payments,  rent,  contractual  saving,  insurance  payments,  education 
expenditures,  and so on-should  be highly correlated  with the debt 
measure,  since  the same  factors  should  affect  the willingness  to incur  both 
these  obligations  and  debt.  Hence the debt  variable  might  well be a proxy 
for these  other  consumer  obligations,  and  the debt  coefficient  would  reflect 
their  influence  as  well as that  of measured  household  liabilities. 
Expenditures on  Consumer Durables. The model  of  equation 7  has 
been estimated  for real  per capita  expenditure  on consumer  durables  with 
two modifications.  Net investment  in consumer  durables  is usually also 
viewed  as a function  of transitory  income,  and  a transitory-income  variable 
(YT)-which  is simply  current  disposable  income minus  permanent  in- 
come-has  thus  been added  to the model of equation  7. Furthermore,  as Frederic S. Mishkin  135 
in the MPS consumption  function,  and as noted  above,  holdings  of stock- 
market  assets  are  assumed  to influence  expenditure  only  with  a distributed 
lag. The lag coefficients  on stock-market  assets were also constrained  to 
lie on an endpoint-constrained  second-degree  polynomial,  and the long- 
run equality  of the stock-market  and non-stock-market  coefficients  was 
imposed. The consumer-durable  model was estimated  with aggregate 
quarterly  data  over the period 1954-72 (described  in the appendix),  ex- 
cluding  six quarters  that were affected  by auto strikes  in 1964 and 1970. 
Instrumental-variables  estimation  with a correction  for first-order  serial 
correlation  (Fair's method) was used to avoid simultaneous-equations 
bias.23  The estimation  results,  with the asymptotic  t statistics  in paren- 
theses, appear  below.24  (All quantities  are in 1958 dollars  per capita  and 
the CD superscript  refers  to the consumer-durables  sector.) 
(8)  EXPCD -  0.5239  +  0.2167  Y-  +  (0.7026  -  0.6409  CAPCCD) 1P 
N  (-3.30)  (2.94) N  (3.39)  (-3.25)  N 
-  0.2630 
K 
-0.3118  DEBT +  0.0632 
-  STK 
(-1.18)  N  (-443)  N  +0062(  N  ) 
+  i  m} (N  K)  +  0.6383u_1. 
4 
E  mi =  0.0632. 
i=O  (4.10) 
R2  =  0.9940;  Durbin-Watson  =  2.01;  standard error  =  0.007104. 
The estimation  results  support  the liquidity  hypothesis  that balance- 
sheet changes  have powerful  effects on consumer-durable  expenditure.25 
The coefficients  of the debt and financial-asset  variables  have the signs 
indicated  by the liquidity  hypothesis  and are highly significant;  the debt 
coefficient  and  the sum  of the stock-market  coefficients  are  over  four  times 
23. The same estimation technique and instruments  used in the equation 2 con- 
sumption function are used here. Again, all the right-hand  variables are treated as 
endogenous. 
24. The lag coefficients on STK/N  were: 0.0231, 0.0173, 0.0121, 0.0074, and 
0.0034. 
25.  Estimates of this liquidity model for the categories of "nonauto"  and "auto 
and parts"  in consumer durables,  found in Mishkin, "Illiquidity,  Consumer  Durable 
Expenditure, and Monetary Policy," are also quite encouraging and lend further 
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their  respective  standard  errors.  Furthermore,  the other  estimated  param- 
eters of the model have the expected  signs, are usually significant,  and 
have  reasonable  magnitudes.  Of a $1 increase  in transitory  income,  22? is 
spent on consumer  durables,  while a permanent  $1 increase  in income 
leads to a long-run  increase  of approximately  25  0 in this kind of spend- 
ing.26  At the  means  of the sample  data,  the short-run  interest-rate  elasticity 
of consumer-durable  expenditure  is -0.20,  while the price elasticity  is 
-1.02.  The lagged  stock coefficient  implies  that over 12 percent  of the 
discrepancy  between desired and actual stocks is made up within the 
quarter-an annual  adjustment  rate  of approximately  40 percent. 
The depressing  effect  of debt  holdings  on purchases  of consumer  dur- 
ables  is quite  substantial:  for every dollar  of liabilities  held at the begin- 
ning of the quarter,  the annual  rate of durable  purchases  will drop by 
31  ? in the short  run. Financial-asset  holdings  have a significant  positive 
effect on the demand  for durables,  though  it is not as strong as the de- 
pressing  effect  of debt;  an extra  dollar  of such  assets  held at the beginning 
of the quarter  leads to a 6.3? increase  in durable  purchases  in the short 
run. 
Moreover,  the decomposition  of balance-sheet  effects into their debt 
and financial-assets  components  is crucial to these significant  findings. 
When  net worth  is separated  into its stock-market  and non-stock-market 
components  as in equation  2 (but debt  is netted  against  non-stock-market 
wealth), the estimated  coefficient  of wealth  is only 0.0008, with a trivial 
asymptotic  t statistic  of 0.01. Barry  Bosworth  similarly  obtained  statis- 
tically  insignificant  results  from  a net-wealth  variable.27 
Expenditures for Single-Family Homes.  In  applying the  equation 7 
model to housing  demand,  the real  value of housing  starts  (HS) was used 
as a proxy for consumer  expenditures  for housing since no appropriate 
direct  data on these outlays  are available.  The equation  was fitted  to the 
real value  per  household  of single-family  housing  starts  over  the 1956-72 
period.  As in the equations  for consumer  durables  and consumption,  esti- 
mation  with instrumental  variables  with a correction  for first-order  serial 
26.  The permanent-income,  transitory-income,  and lagged-durable-stocks  terms 
lead to a fairly complicated lag structure for income. A  $1 sustained increase in 
income leads to increased expenditure on consumer durables of  25? in the initial 
quarter;  the effect rises to a peak of 33? in the eleventh quarter,  and then declines to 
a long-run 25?. 
27.  Bosworth, "Stock  Market and the Economy,"  pp. 265, 268. Frederic S. Mishkin  137 
correlation  was used to avoid simultaneous-equation  bias.28  The estima- 
tion  results,  with  asymptotic  t statistics  in parentheses,  are  as  follows: 29 
() 
HH  =-0.  1108 +  (0.2028 -  0.5240 CAPCS)  -0.4438  (-0.12)  (3.61)  (-3.87)  HH  (-  3.40)  HH 
FIN  Ks_j  +  0.0322  -  0.1348 K-  +  0.5516u1, 
(4.27)  HH  (-1.  18) HH 
R2 =  0.8603; Durbin-Watson  =  2.05; standard  error =  0.01508. 
where  HH is U.S. households,  HSS  is the real  value of single-family  hous- 
ing starts,  and  KS  is the stock  of single-family  housing. 
The liquidity  housing  model is encouraging.  All the coefficients  in the 
28.  The basic set of instruments  includes the discount rate, unborrowed  reserves 
plus currency outside of banks, exports, federal government expenditures,  the per- 
sonal tax rate, the price of imports,  the price of farm products,  the constant  term, and 
households. All the right-hand  variables were treated as endogenous. Fair's method 
with the appropriate  additional  instruments  was used in estimation. 
29.  Since illiquidity  is a feature of a leased-as  well as an owned-tangible  asset, 
the liquidity model might be applied to leased assets such as multifamily housing 
(HSm). Estimation  results for the multifamily liquidity  model from Kearl and Mish- 
kin, "Illiquidity,"  appear  below. 
HSm  =  -07443  +  (0.1356-  0.0340  CAPCm)  -  0.2554 
DEBT 
HH  (-3.28)  (1.98)  (-0.20)  HH  (-2.49)  HH 
+ 0.0223  -0.0840  KM  + 0.8654  u-i. 
(3.09)  HH  (-0  31)  -1 
R2=  0.9365;  Durbin-Watson  =  1.85;  standard  error =  0.01256. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are asymptotic  t statistics. 
Although the debt and financial-assets  variables have the appropriate  signs and 
are significantly  different  from zero at the 5 percent level, these liquidity results are 
not robust when credit-rationing  variables are added to the regression  model. 
Postsample  tracking  of the multifamily  model also casts doubt on the usefulness  of 
this equation.  It severely overpredicts  multifamily  starts  after 1973:3, and fails to pre- 
dict the almost total collapse in multifamily construction,  and its postsample  tracking 
ability is worse than a multifamily housing model that excludes balance-sheet  effects. 
It is entirely possible that the liquidity variables are proxies for credit-rationing 
effects in the multifamily housing regressions.  This is not altogether surprising,  con- 
sidering the speculative nature of  the multifamily housing market, in which pro- 
ducers' decisions might be far more important  to fluctuations in starts than is true 
for single-family  housing. Moreover, this model does not incorporate  the major insti- 
tutional shifts that have taken place in this market as a result of rent control, the 
advent  of real estate investment  trusts, and the condominium  boom. Further  research 
dealing  with these issues is certainly  needed to clarify the major factors that influence 
fluctuations  in multifamily construction. 138  Brookings PaDers on Economic  Activity.  1:1977 
model are of the appropriate  sign, and those of nonmortgage  household 
liabilities  and household  holdings  of financial  assets are significantly  dif- 
ferent  from zero at the 1 percent  level. (As noted above, these variables 
differ  somewhat  from  their  counterparts  in the consumer-durable  model.) 
Unlike  consumer  durables,  the financial-assets  measure  is not split  up into 
its stock and nonstock components  since experiments  did not indicate 
the presence  of a distributed  lag in the impact  of stock-market  assets on 
housing  starts.  The balance-sheet  effects are again substantial.  A $1 in- 
crease  in nonmortgage  household  liabilities  leads to a 44? decline  in the 
real  value  of housing  starts  in the short  run  while  a $1 increase  in holdings 
of financial  assets  results  in a 3.20 short-run  increase  in the real value of 
housing  starts.30  A permanent  $1 increase  in income leads to a long-run 
increase  in single-family  housing  starts  of approximately  1  ?, and  the short- 
run  interest  elasticity  is -0.94.  The lagged  stock coefficients  indicate  that 
15 percent  of the gap  between  the desired  and  actual  stock  of single-family 
housing  is made  up  within  the  year. 
Credit  rationing  has been a central  concern  in housing  research.3'  Not 
only the cost of credit  but its availability  is thought  to be important  in 
determining  the  level of housing  activity.  Researchers  have  used a number 
of proxies  for the postulated  effects  of credit  rationing,  including  deposit 
stocks  or flows  at thrift  institutions,  federal  intermediary  activity,  changes 
in mortgage  commitments,  and the spread between short-term  interest 
rates and the mortgage  rate. Could the significant  balance-sheet  effects 
found in the housing  model be spurious  because the balance-sheet  vari- 
ables serve as proxies for credit-rationing  effects? Experiments  with 
various  measures  of credit rationing,  reported  in table 1, indicate that 
balance-sheet  effects are far more important  to fluctuations  in single- 
30. If the more inclusive liabilities measure is used in these regressions-that  is, 
if mortgages are not excluded from the debt measure-the  debt coefficients in the 
single- and multifamily equations are only a third of the value reported  above. With 
the more inclusive measure  all the balance-sheet  coefficients  are still significant  at the 
5 percent level. The case for excluding mortgages from the debt measure in housing 
models seems reasonable,  yet a case could also be made for using the more inclusive 
debt measure. The choice would not appreciably  affect the macroeconomic implica- 
tions of the housing equations,  nor the results  of this paper. 
31. James Kearl, Kenneth Rosen, and Craig Swan, "Relationships  Between the 
Mortgage Instruments,  the Demand for Housing and Mortgage Credit: A Review of 
Empirical Studies,"  in Donald Lessard and Franco Modigliani, eds., New Mortgage 
Designs for Stable Housing in an Inflationary  Environment, Proceedings of a Con- 
ference (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1975), pp. 93-109. Frederic S. Mishkin  139 
family  housing  starts  than are  credit-rationing  effects.  None of the credit- 
rationing  measures  ever enters  the housing  model significantly,  while the 
coefficients  of the debt and financial-assets  variables  always  remain  sig- 
nificant  and of the correct  sign. These tests lend further  support  to the 
liquidity  view  for single-family  housing. 
TRACKING  THE  RECENT  RECESSION  AND  RECOVERY 
The validity  and usefulness  of including  balance-sheet  effects in the 
model presented  above  can be tested  by comparing  the postsample  track- 
ing ability of these models for 1973-76  with so-called "non-balance- 
sheet"  models that exclude  such effects.  The equations  for consumption 
(CON), consumer  durables  (EXPCD), and housing  (HSS) have been re- 
estimated  with the balance-sheet  variables  excluded.  The results, using 
the same estimation  techniques  and sample periods as for the models 
presented  previously,  with the asymptotic  t statistics  in parentheses,  ap- 
pear  below.32 
(10)  CON  _  t  YD\  N  E  bi kN,L  +  0.9215u-,. 
11 
Eb  =  0.927. 
i=O  (138.4) 
RI  0.991;  Durbin-Watson  =  1.97; standard error  =  0.008317. 
(11) EX  - -0.2205  +  0.1954  +  (0.4611 -  0.7982 CAPCCD) 
N  (-1.52)  (2.01)  N  (2.39)  (-3.10)  N 
KCD 
-  0.0535  -1  +  0.7846u_1. 
(-0.23)  N 
R2=  0.9919; Durbin-Watson  -- 1.75; standard  error =  0.008111. 
(12)  HSs  =  2.6481 +  (0.1111 -  0.8084 CAPCS) YH  HH  (5.19)  (4.15)  (-4.81)  HH 
-  0.4135  KH-I  +  0.7638u_1. 
(-  4.96) HH 
RI =  0.8571; Durbin-Watson  =  2.04; standard  error =  0.015008. 
Figures  2 through  4 compare  the postsample  tracking  of the balance- 
32. The instruments  used in estimation are the sanme  as those for the correspond- 
ing models presented  earlier. ~~~  -  0  C0* 
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Figure 2.  PostsampIe Predictions from Balance-Sheet Life-Cycle and 
Non-Balance-Sheet Consumption  Models, Quarterly, 1973:1-1976:3 
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Sources: Predicted-derived  from  text equations 2  and  10;a ctual-1973:1-1975:3,  MPS data bank; 
later quarters were constructed using the rate of change of the revised data of the U.S.  Department of 
Commerce to extrapolate the unrevised data. 
sheet models with that of the other models. The predictions  have been 
generated  with historical  data and with no correction  for serial correla- 
tion.33 
The balance-sheet  life-cycle consumption  function performs  well in 
the contraction  phase of the recession.  It tracks  the sluggishness  in con- 
sumption  demand  after  the third  quarter  of 1973 and does not systemati- 
cally under-  or overpredict  consumption  in this period.  The non-balance- 
sheet consumption  equation  does not perform  as well in the contraction 
phase. It grossly overpredicts  consumption  in late 1973 and 1974. Al- 
33.  The  data used here for the quarters 1975:4-1976:3  were constructed by 
using the rate of change of the new, revised data of the U.S. Department of Com- 
merce to extrapolate  the unrevised  data through 1976:3. 
Postsample dynamic simulations of the consumer-durable  and housing models, 
balance-sheet and non-balance-sheet,  in which the lagged stock term is treated as 
endogenous, yield results similar to those in the text. Frederic S. Mishkin  143 
Figure  3. Postsample  Predictions  from  Liquidity  and  Non-Balance-Sheet 
Consumer-Durable  Models,  Quarterly,  1973:1-1976:3 
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Source: Predicted-derived  from text equations 8 and II; actual-same  as figure 2. 
though  the balance-sheet  equation  indicates  an upturn  in consumption  in 
1975 and 1976, it underpredicts  the rise in consumption  in the recovery 
period.  Still,  it outperforms  the non-balance-sheet  equation  model  for the 
whole  period  by a wide margin;  it has a root mean-square  error  (RMSE) 
for the 1973-76 period  of $8.2 billion,  a third  less than  the $12.4 billion 
RMSE  for  the non-balance-sheet  equation. 
The liquidity  consumer-durable  model tracks well in both recession 
and recovery  during  the 1973-76 period. It captures  almost the entire 
collapse  in consumer-durable  expenditure  from the peak in 1973:1 and 
is within  one quarter  of catching  the 1973:1 and 1974:4 turning  points 
of the series.  It also nicely  tracks  the $20 billion (1958 prices,  as always) 
upturn  in expenditures  for consumer  durables  in 1975 and 1976, and 
displays no systematic  under- or overprediction  (see figure 3).  When 
balance-sheet  items  are excluded,  the ability  to predict  consumer-durable 
expenditure  is far inferior: the turning  point in 1973:1 is completely 144  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
Figure 4.  Postsample Predictions  from Liquidity  and Non-Balance-Sheet 
Models for Single-Family  Housing, 1973:1-1976:3 
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Source: Predicted-derived  from text equations 9 and 12; actual-see  the appendix. 
missed,  a severe  overprediction  occurs  after  the  third  quarter  of 1973, and 
the 20 percent  decline  from 1973:1 to 1974:4 is not tracked  at all. The 
$8.5 billion RMSE for 1973-76 of the non-balance-sheet  model is well 
over  double  the $3.5 billion  RMSE  of the  liquidity  model. 
As shown in figure  4, the liquidity  model tracks  the drop of over 40 
percent in single-family  housing starts, and misses the 1975:1 turning 
point by only one quarter.  The strength  of demand for single-family 
housing  in 1975 and 1976 is also well predicted.  Although  it tracks  rea- 
sonably well during  the 1973-75 period, the non-balance-sheet,  single- 
family  housing  model does not perform  as well. Furthermore,  it does not 
track  the upturn  in starts  with much  precision,  for it indicates  a weaken- 
ing in  1976 that never materialized.  The liquidity  model's RMSE for 
1973-76 of $1.9 billion is almost  a third  less than  the non-balance-sheet 
model's  RMSE  of $2.7 billion. 
The evidence  presented  here  indicates  that  the life-cycle  model of con- Frederic  S. Mishkin  145 
sumption  and the liquidity  models for consumer  durables  and single- 
family  housing  have  good  tracking  records  outside  the  period  of sample  fit. 
The  performance  of the liquidity  models  of consumer  durables  and  single- 
family housing-which use estimated  coefficients  unaltered  from their 
previously  published  values-is  particularly  impressive  since both the 
downturn  and upturn  in the series are accurately  tracked.  Postsample 
prediction  ability  in this period should be a fairly stringent  test of the 
usefulness  of including  household  balance-sheet  effects  in models  for these 
sectors. 
THREE  FURTHER  ISSUES 
The  balance-sheet  effects  that  show  up  in equations  2, 8, and  9 would  be 
suspect  if they are misspecified.  First, these effects may be proxies for 
current-income  effects that are suppressed  because the long polynomial 
distributed  lags in income  weight  current  income  inadequately.84  Second, 
the constraint  that household  holdings  of stock-market  assets have the 
same long-run  effect on demand  as other types of assets do may not be 
empirically  valid, and its imposition  may affect the estimates  of stock- 
market  effects.85  Finally,  a problem  arises  because  the use of a distributed 
lag on household holdings of stock-market  assets-a  practice without 
strong  theoretical  justification-may be responsible  for the appearance  of 
balance-sheet  effects. 
Current-Income  Effect.  The first  issue, that balance-sheet  effects  may 
be a proxy  for an understated  current-income  effect,  is a problem  only for 
the consumption  equation.  In the case of consumer  durables,  current 
income  is entered  directly  in the equation  through  the transitory-income 
variable,  the difference  between  current  disposable  income  and  permanent 
income. Since permanent  income is an explanatory  variable,  the model 
used  for estimation  purposes  is exactly  equivalent  to one in which  current 
disposable  income replaces transitory  income. If transitory  income is 
added  to the regression  models for housing,  its coefficient  is always  in- 
34. See the Wharton model for an example of models with shorter income lags 
and larger current-income effects. It is  described in Michael D.  McCarthy, The 
Wharton  Quarterly  Econometric Forecasting Model Mark III (University of Penn- 
sylvania,  Economics Research  Unit, 1972). 
35. Bosworth,  "Stock  Market  and the Economy." 146  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
significant  and negative-the wrong  sign-whether or not balance-sheet 
variables  are included.86  These  results  agree  with  those of other  research- 
ers, who do not find  a significant  effect  of current  income,  independent  of 
permanent  income,  on housing  demand.87 
Table 2 deals  with  the current-income  issue  for the consumption  equa- 
tion. To test whether the long polynomial distributed  lag on income 
gives  insufficient  weight  to current  income  and  thereby  results  in significant 
wealth coefficients,  current  disposable  income  per capita  has been added 
to the model of equation  2. Current  income does not enter significantly 
into this  regression,  thus  casting  doubt  on the proposition  that  the current- 
income effect is understated  in the life-cycle consumption  equation.  In 
addition,  entering  an unrestricted  variable  for current  disposable  income 
into the consumption  regression  does not appreciably  change  the wealth 
effect, nor does it reduce  its statistical  significance.  To see whether  the 
distributed  lag on income  is too long and  thus  results  in significant  wealth 
effects,  equation  2 has been run  with  lags of varying  lengths  that have not 
been  restricted  to lie on a second-order  polynomial.  This  unrestricted  form 
allows the greatest  flexibility  for the income  coefficients,  and permits  the 
most  general  test of the effect  of choosing  a particular  distributed-lag  form 
for income.  In all cases  the coefficient  (STK/N) on overall  wealth  remains 
significant  at the 1 percent  level and retains  its high value. A deteriora- 
tion in fit becomes  increasingly  apparent  as the income lag is shortened, 
while  the autocorrelation  coefficient-often a measure  of misspecification 
-rises  as the lag drops  below  twelve  quarters.  The evidence  suggests  that 
a twelve-quarter  lag on disposable  income does not lead to a gross mis- 
specification  of income  effects,  and that  the effect  of wealth  on consump- 
tion  remains  strong  regardless  of the  income  lag chosen. 
Although  the life-cycle  model implies  that a constant  term  should  not 
be included  in the consumption  regressions,  one has been added  in several 
cases as a test. In all these cases, the wealth effects remain  statistically 
significant  at the 1 percent  level. For example,  when a constant  term is 
added  to the third  equation  in table 2 the drop  in the total wealth  effect  is 
less than 10 percent;  the constant  term is insignificant  at the 5 percent 
level;  and  the added  current-income  variable  is still  insignificantly  different 
from  zero. 
36.  The asymptotic t statistics are always less than 1.6 in absolute value. 
37.  See Kearl and others, "Relationships  Between the Mortgage  Instruments,  the 
Demand for Housing and Mortgage  Credit." QOC  tf)  ON  e  r  yn  CD  O  y 
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ASSETS  CONSTRAINT 
For the "assets constraint"  to be valid in aggregate  equations,  the 
responses  to changes  in balance sheets should not differ  much between 
the wealthy, who hold the bulk of  equities, and the less well-to-do, 
who hold much of their wealth  in tangible  assets and savings  accounts. 
Furthermore,  as Barry  Bosworth  has recently  pointed  out, changes  in the 
value of assets  that result  from changes  in interest  rates, as is often the 
case for common  stocks,  will not have  the same  impact  on expenditure  as 
changes  in the  value  of assets  due  to other  events:  the income  and  substitu- 
tion effects  are quite  different.  Thus changes  in the value of stock-market 
assets  might  not have  the same  effect  on demand  as changes  in households' 
savings  deposits  and the like. Is the assets constraint  empirically  valid? 
And, how different  are estimates  of balance-sheet  effects  as a result  of the 
imposition  of this  constraint? 
Tests designed  to answer  that question  for the balance-sheet  models  of 
consumption,  consumer  durables,  and housing  can be found in tables 3 
and  4. In none of these  regressions  can the assets  constraint  be rejected  at 
the 5 percent  level of significance,  nor does relaxation  of this constraint 
eliminate  balance-sheet  effects  operating  through  the stock market.  For 
consumption,  stock-market  effects  do decline  slightly  when  the assets  con- 
straint  is not imposed:  the sum of the coefficients  on stock-market  assets 
drops  approximately  18 percent.  In the regressions  of the liquidity  model, 
stock-market  effects  change  by less than 10 percent  when the assets  con- 
straint  is not imposed,  and  are  sometimes  lower  when  it is. In the liquidity 
regressions,  because  the measure  of nonstock  assets has very little varia- 
tion around  its trend  rate of growth,  the coefficient  on nonstock  assets  is 
estimated  with great  imprecision,  as evidenced  by the small asymptotic 
t statistics.  Results  on the effects  of nonstock  assets neither  support  nor 
reject  the liquidity  hypothesis.  The assets  constraint  has been imposed  in 
the earlier  liquidity  regressions,  8 and 9, simply because this results  in 
more  sensible  equations. 
Imposition  of the assets constraint  does not appear  to be empirically 
unwarranted,  and  it leaves  intact  most of the stock-market  effects  operat- 
ing  through  the  household  balance  sheet. 
Distributed  Lags. Tables 3 and 4 also contain  estimates  of household 
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without distributed  lags. In these cases, the household balance-sheet 
effects  still  remain  powerful  and  statistically  significant.38 
The 1973-75 Recession 
The theories  and  empirical  work  described  above  indicate  the channels 
through  which  shifts  in household  balance  sheets could  have affected  ag- 
gregate  demand  in the 1973-75  recession. In fact, household  financial 
positions  did  undergo  a radical  deterioration  during  that  period,  and  could 
supply  a partial  explanation  for its severity.  The deterioration  in house- 
hold balance sheets that began early in 1973 and became particularly 
serious  by the end  of 1974 may  have  depressed  consumption  because  con- 
sumers'  lifetime  resources  had  diminished.  Furthermore,  consumers  found 
themselves  in a weaker financial  position. Coupled with increased  un- 
certainty,  this weakening  may have turned  them away  from purchases  of 
illiquid  assets  such  as consumer  durables  and  housing  because  the possible 
loss from  holding  them  had increased  along  with the probability  of finan- 
cial distress.  Only  with  the improvement  in financial  position  in 1975 did 
consumers  return  to the marketplace  to spur expenditures  on consump- 
tion  goods  and  housing  demand. 
This  story  seems  plausible,  yet the question  still  remains,  how important 
were  these  balance-sheet  effects  in the economic  downturn? 
To attempt  to answer  these  questions,  I have  used dynamic  simulations 
with  the estimated  life-cycle  and  liquidity  equations-equations 2, 8, and 
9. Estimates  of household  balance-sheet  effects  on aggregate  demand  can 
be derived  by comparing  simulations  of a hypothetical  system,  in which 
these effects  have been suppressed  for the 1973-75 period,  to "control" 
simulations  in which they are present.39  In the control simulations,  the 
residuals  (the difference  between  the fitted  and  actual  values  of the depen- 
38. The index of consumer sentiment compiled by the Survey Research Center 
and a filtered version of  this index (Juster and Wachtel, "Inflation and the Con- 
sumer") have been added to liquidity-model  regressions  for consumer durables and 
housing.  These sentiment  variables  are never significant,  while the debt and financial- 
assets coefficients still retain their appropriate  signs and continue to be statistically 
significant. Results reported in Modigliani, "Monetary Policy and Consumption," 
also indicate that balance-sheet effects do not disappear and become statistically 
insignificant  when sentiment variables are included in consumption  regressions. 
39. This is a standard  simulation technique.  For one application,  see ibid. 
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dent  variable) are  fed back  into the equation,  and  the household  balance- 
sheet items are allowed  to take on their historical  values. These control 
simulations  will thus track the historical  data exactly in the 1973-75 
period.  In simulations  in which  balance-sheet  effects  are suppressed,  the 
control  residuals  are  again  fed back  into the equations-thus insuring  that 
effects other than those from balance sheets still operate-and  the bal- 
ance-sheet  items (in real terms) of each equation  are allowed to trend 
from the 1972:4 value using growth  rates calculated  from the five-year 
period 1967:4 to  1972:4.40  This technique freezes out balance-sheet 
effects  on any equation  for the 1973-75 period.  The difference  between 
results  from these hypothetical  simulations  and from the control  simula- 
tions  provides  measures  of the impact  of balance-sheet  shifts  on demand.41 
One possible  way of proceeding  would  be to undertake  simulation  ex- 
periments  in which the liquidity  and life-cycle equations  have been em- 
bedded  in a macroeconometric  model,  and,  using  the techniques  discussed 
above,  derive  the overall  household  balance-sheet  effects  on the economy 
during  the 1973-75 period.  This  procedure  presents  the  thorny  problem  of 
choosing  a particular  macroeconometric  model from the many available 
alternatives.  Because,  at present,  there is no agreed-upon  "best"  macro- 
econometric  model,  a different  approach  seems  warranted.  First,  dynamic 
simulation  experiments  with  only the life-cycle  and  liquidity  equations  are 
used to derive estimates  of household  balance-sheet  effects. These esti- 
mates,  which  have been generated  without  a general-equilibrium,  macro- 
econometric  model, will reflect  only direct,  partial  effects,  and not multi- 
plier-accelerator,  feedback  interactions  from the rest of the economy  on 
the consumption  and housing  sectors.  Even though  these estimates  will 
thus understate  the overall balance-sheet  effects, they have the distinct 
advantage  of being independent  of the properties  of a particular  macro 
model.  Full-system  simulations  with  such  a model-in  this case, the 1975 
40.  The annual growth rates used to calculate the trend values of the balance- 
sheet items (in real terms) are as follows: household liabilities, 4.1 percent;  house- 
hold mortgages, 3.5 percent; nonstock net wealth, 3.5 percent; nonstock financial 
assets, 3.1 percent;  and stock-market  assets, 4.1 percent. 
41.  It is somewhat difficult  to isolate the effects of one factor in the economy if 
it interacts  with other factors in a simultaneous  system. Thus in some sense the simu- 
lation experiments  of this section are artificial,  because balance-sheet  effects are sup- 
pressed without acknowledging that this would affect other behavioral relations. 
Nonetheless, these experiments are useful, for they are one way of getting at the 
questions  posed in the text. Frederic S. Mishkin  153 
Table 5.  Direct, Partial Effects of Household Balance Sheets on 
Aggregate Demand in Selected Sectors, 1973:1-1975:3 
Billions of 1958  dollars 
Consumer-  Value of 
durable  single-famnily 
Year and quarter  Consumption  expenditzures  housinig  starts 
1973:1  -1.5  -1.4  -1.3 
2  -2.7  -2.8  -2.5 
3  -2.3  -4.4  -3.2 
4  -5.5  -6.7  -4.2 
1974:1  -10.4  -7.6  -4.2 
2  -13.8  -8.4  -3.5 
3  -17.4  -9.9  -3.9 
4  -21.8  -12.1  -4.6 
1975:1  -24.8  -12.9  -3.0 
2  -25.2  -11.8  -0.3 
3  -25.3  -9.7  1.8 
Sources: Results from dynamic simulations starting in  1973:1 using text equations 2,  8, and 9. Only 
the lagged stock terms in text equations 8 and 9 are treated as endogenous. The lagged stock terms are 
generated  from a perpetual-inventory  equation (used in generating the stock series in the first place) using 
the simulated values from the previous period. The table above gives estimates of the difference between 
control simulations in which the residuals have been fed back into the models so that the models track 
the actual historical data, and simulations with the residuals adjustment in which all the balance-sheet 
items have been set at their trend levels. 
version  of the MPS model-can  then provide  further  information  on the 
overall  magnitude  of household  balance-sheet  effects. 
DIRECT,  PARTIAL  EFFECTS 
Estimates of direct, partial effects of household balance sheets on 
consumption  expenditures  for consumer  durables  and housing  starts  are 
presented  in table 5. Table 6 converts  the results  of table 5 into expendi- 
ture  effects  consistent  with the concepts  of the national  income accounts. 
Even  ignoring  the possible  amplification  by multiplier-accelerator  inter- 
actions,  table  6 shows  that changes  in the household  balance  sheet  during 
1973-75 acted as a powerful  depressant  on the economy.  The balance- 
sheet effects  began  to have a substantial  impact  toward  the end of 1973, 
and by the 1975:1  trough, had contributed to a $37.6  billion drop in ag- 
gregate  demand  (again,  all dollar  values  are  in 1958 prices). To put  these 
simulation  results in perspective,  the final column of table 6 gives a 
measure  of the recession  gap developed  by Barry  Bosworth,  which  shows 
the difference  between actual GNP and a level that would have been 154  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
Table 6.  Direct, Partial Effects of Household Balance Sheets on 
Aggregate Demand in Selected NIA Components,  and Recession Gap, 
1973:1-1975:3 
Billions of 1958 dollars 
Predicted  change  in demand 
Personal  Total 
consumption  Housing  recession 
Year  and  expenditures  expenditures  Total  gapa 
quarter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1973:1  -2.8  -0.5  -3.3  10.5 
2  -5.2  -1.6  -6.8  7.0 
3  -6.2  -2.6  -8.8  2.2 
4  -11.2  -3.4  -14.6  -1.1 
1974:1  -16.7  -3.9  -20.6  -24.6 
2  -20.3  -3.8  -24.1  -36.5 
3  -25.0  -3.6  -28.6  -49.0 
4  -30.9  -4.1  -35.0  -76.7 
1975:1  -34.0  -3.6  -37.6  -109.4 
2  -32.7  -1.9  -34.6  -114.6 
3  -30.3  0.3  -30.0  -98.7 
Source: Simulation results of table 5 converted to expenditures with MPS equations for personal con- 
sumption expenditures and housing expenditures. Column 3 is  the sum  of  columns 1 and 2. Detailed 
procedures are available from the author on request. 
a.  The measure of the recession gap, developed by Barry Bosworth, equals the difference  between actual 
GNP and the level that would have been achieved had actual GNP maintained the relationship to potential 
GNP  that existed in 1972:4. See Barry Bosworth, "The Stock Market and the Economy," BPEA, 2:1975, 
p. 290. 
achieved  had actual  GNP maintained  the relationship  to potential  GNP 
that  existed  in the  fourth  quarter  of 1972. The 1975:  1 figures  thus  indicate 
that the direct impact of fluctuations  in household balance sheets can 
account  for one-third  of the falloff in real aggregate  demand  during  the 
1973-75 recession.42 
The simulation  results  in tables 5 and 6 also suggest  that in the early 
stages  of the recession,  over  half of the balance-sheet  effects  occurred  in 
housing  and consumer  durables  operating  through  the consumer-liquidity 
42.  A comparison  of these balance-sheet  effects with the income effects in regres- 
sions for consumption,  consumer durables,  and housing might put the balance-sheet 
effects in better perspective. Income effects are obtained from a simulation experi- 
ment in which real disposable income after 1972:4 is kept at the same ratio to 
potential GNP as in 1972:4. The total income effects on expenditure  reaches $33 bil- 
lion by the first quarter  of  1975, and this is about 10 percent less than the balance- 
sheet effects estimated above. Because of  issues raised in the work mentioned in 
note 6, this income-effects  simulation must be interpreted  with great care, and it is 
reported  here more for comparison  purposes  than as a guide for policy. Frederic S. Mishkin  155 
Table  7. Full-System  Effects  of Household  Balance  Sheets  on 
Aggregate  Demand,  1973:1-1975:3 
Billions of 1958 dolars 
Predicted  change  in demand 
Personal  Total  Total 
Year  and  consumption  Housing  gross  national  recession 
quarter  expenditures  expenditures  product  gapa 
1973:1  -3.0  -0.5  -3.0  10.5 
2  -5.8  -1.6  -8.0  7.0 
3  -7.2  -2.5  -11.4  2.2 
4  -13.0  -3.2  -17.5  -1.1 
1974:1  -19.1  -3.6  -25.4  -24.6 
2  -23.3  -3.2  -30.3  -36.5 
3  -28.6  -2.7  -34.8  -49.0 
4  -35.2  -2.7  -40.8  -76.7 
1975:1  -39.4  -1.9  -44.7  -109.4 
2  -40.2  0.1  -42.2  -114.6 
3  -38.0  2.1  -32.7  -98.7 
Sources: Results from dynamic simulations starting in 1973:1 using text equations 2, 8 and 9 and the 
full MPS model (all equations have residual adjustments).  The balance-sheet items in equations 2, 8, and 9 
were set at their trend levels. 
a. See table 6, note a. 
channel.  Net-wealth  effects  on consumption  took longer  to build  up than 
did liquidity  effects, in part because of the longer stock-market  lags in 
the life-cycle consumption  function. They began to dominate  liquidity 
effects  by the  middle  of 1974. 
FULL-SYSTEM  EFFECTS 
The experiments  with the current  version  of the MPS  model, and with 
the life-cycle  and  liquidity  equations,  provide  estimates  of the full-system, 
general-equilibrium  impact of household  balance-sheet  effects. Table 7 
reports  these  estimates. 
The effects on the system as a whole are approximately  20 percent 
larger  than the direct effects as a result of multiplier-accelerator  inter- 
actions,  but they display  a similar  pattern.  For the 1973-75 period, the 
overall  effects  of household  balance-sheet  changes  on aggregate  demand 
are  estimated  to be as high  as $44.7 billion.43 
43. The multiplier-accelerator  amplification  of balance-sheet effects is small in 
this version of the MPS model. An alternative  macroeconometric  model might lead 
to even larger full-system balance-sheet  effects than are reported  here. 156  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
Several conclusions  can be drawn  from the simulation  experiments. 
The sharp  deterioration  in household  balance sheets indeed appears  to 
have been a major  factor  in the severity  of the economic  downturn.  The 
full-system  simulations  indicate  that it was responsible  for 40 percent  of 
the depressive  effects  during  the 1973-75 recession.  In the early  stages  of 
the recession,  liquidity  effects  were especially  important  to the decline  in 
aggregate  demand  as they  depressed  consumer  demand  for illiquid  assets, 
consumer  durables  and  housing.  Toward  the end  of the recession,  balance- 
sheet effects  operated  more through  net-wealth,  life-cycle channels.  The 
simulaton  evidence  presented  here lends credence  to the stress on life- 
cycle and liquidity  balance-sheet  effects  as factors  in the economic  con- 
traction  of 1973-75. 
The  Stock  Market  and  the 1973-75 Recession 
The link between  prices  of common  stocks and aggregate  demand  has 
drawn  increasing  attention  as a research  topic in recent  years,  stimulated 
by additional  evidence  that  changes  in common-stock  prices  tend to lead 
business-cycle  developments."  Although  several  investigators  concentrate 
on the behavior  of business  firms45  in studying  stock-market  effects,  the 
models discussed  here present  a different  view. Movements  in common- 
stock prices tend to be an important  factor behind shifts in household 
balance  sheets, and thus the life-cycle  and liquidity  hypotheses  postulate 
that changes  in stock prices can affect aggregate  demand  by influencing 
consumer  behavior. 
During  the 1973-75 recession,  which  saw the worst  bear  market  since 
the Great  Depression,  the impact  of the stock market  on the household 
balance  sheet was indeed  sizable. Over 90 percent  of the decline in the 
real  holdings  of financial  assets  from 1973 to 1974 resulted  from  the drop 
44.  See Beryl W. Sprinkel,  Money and Stock Prices (Irwin, 1964), pp. 115-20, 
and the literature  on leading economic indicators. 
45.  See James Tobin, "A General Equilibrium  Approach to Monetary Theory," 
Journal of Money, Credit,  and Banking,  vol. 1 (February 1969), pp. 15-29; John H. 
Ciccolo, Jr., "Four Essays on Monetary Policy" (Ph.D. dissertation,  Yale Univer- 
sity, 1975); Charles W. Bischoff, "The Effect of Alternative Lag Distributions,"  in 
Gary Fromm, ed.,  Tax Incentives and Capital Spending (Brookings Institution, 
1971), pp. 61-125; and a review of this literature in Bosworth, "Stock Market and 
the Economy." Frederic S. Mishkin  157 
Table  8. Decomposition  of Direct,  Partial  Effects  of Household 
Balance  Sheets  on Aggregate  Demand  from  Debt,  and 
Nonstock  and  Stock-Market  Assets,  1973:1-1975:3 
Predicted  change  in demand  in billions of 1958 dollars 
Stock-market 
assets  intcluding 
inzduced 
Stock-  effects  on other 
Nonstock  market  items in  tile 
Year  and  Total  Debt  assets  assets  balance  sheet 
quarter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1973:1  -3.3  -1.4  -1.3  -0.6  -0.6 
2  -6.8  -1.6  -2.1  -3.1  -3.0 
3  -8.8  -1.0  -0.5  -7.3  -7.1 
4  -14.6  0.0  -2.3  -12.3  -11.6 
1974:1  -20.6  3.1  -5.3  -18.4  -17.0 
2  -24.1  7.2  -6.6  -24.7  -22.4 
3  -28.6  11.1  -7.4  -32.3  -28.7 
4  -35.0  14.2  -8.6  -40.6  -35.6 
1975:1  -37.6  16.0  -8.6  -45.0  -38.4 
2  -34.6  17.2  -7.6  -44.2  -36.0 
3  -30.0  18.2  -6.6  -41.6  -32.4 
Sources: Column 1 is from table 6, and is decomposed in columns 2, 3, and 4. Column 2 gives the simu- 
lation  results using text equations 2,  8, and 9, in which liability items are set at their trend values with 
all other balance-sheet items at historical values. Column 3 gives results of siml-ulations  in wvhich  the non- 
stock-asset  items are set at their trend values with all other balance-sheet  items at historical values. Column 4 
gives results of simulations in which the stock-market variable is  set at  its  trend values with all  other 
balance-sheet items at historical values. 
Column 5 repeats the experiment of column 4, allowing for induced effects on the other items in the 
balance sheet by using additional equations to solve endogenously for  these other balance-sheet items. 
Details are available from the author on request. 
in the value of common stocks.46  Simulations  with the life-cycle and 
liquidity  models again provide new information  on the size of stock- 
market  effects during  this recession-a  subject that has recently been 
analyzed  by Barry Bosworth.4 These experiments  should also indicate 
what proportion  of the effects  that operated  through  household  balance 
sheets  was  attributable  to the stock  market. 
Table 8 presents  the components  of the direct  balance-sheet  effects  of 
table 6: effects  from (1)  liabilities,  (2)  nonstock  assets, and (3)  stock 
assets (stemming  from each item's  deviation  from  trend). The decline  in 
46. The real value of household holdings of common stock fell by $335 billion 
from the beginning  of 1973 to the end of 1974, versus a $357 billion decline in total 
holdings  of real financial  assets (1958 prices). 
47.  Bosworth,  "Stock  Market  and the Economy." 158  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
the  real  value  of liabilities  after  1973:4, mostly  the result  of price  increases 
beneficial  to debtors,  partially  counteracted  the depressive  effects  from  the 
assets side of the balance sheet. Unanticipated  price increases,  which 
knocked  down  the real  value  of nominally  dominated  financial  assets,  were 
also responsible  for the depressive  effects from nonstock assets. Stock- 
market  effects  resulted  from  the combination  of a rising  price  level and a 
declining  nominal  view  of common  stocks. 
The stock-market  component  of the direct  balance-sheet  effects  reaches 
$45 billion (again, 1958 prices) by 1975:1, yet this figure  overstates  a 
more  appropriately  defined  effect.  When  the stock  market  declines,  damp- 
ening consumer  spending  and residential  construction  as in the models 
presented  here,  the other  items  in the household  balance  sheet  would  not 
remain  unchanged,  as they do in the simulation  experiments  of table 8. 
Purchases  of consumer  durables  and housing  are frequently  financed  by 
borrowing,  and  a decline  in purchases  of these  goods induced  by the stock 
market  should  slow growth  of liabilities,  thus offsetting  some of the de- 
pressive  stock-market  effect.  In addition,  a fall in consumer  spending  in- 
duced by the stock market  will raise the personal  saving  rate, leading  to 
greater  holdings of financial  assets, which will also counter  the stock- 
market  effect.  Column  5 of table 8 presents  simulation  results  allowing  for 
these induced  effects  on other  items in the balance  sheet (by solving  en- 
dogenously  for these items  using additional  equations). These estimated 
stock-market  effects  on household  spending  are a sizable  $38.4 billion  by 
1975 :1  -less  than  the column  4 figure  because  of the induced  effects,  yet 
of a magnitude  similar  to the  total  direct  balance-sheet  effects  of column  1. 
As the Bosworth  discussion  emphasizes,  changes  in prices  of common 
stock  might  also  influence  aggregate  demand  through  business  fixed  invest- 
ment.48  How large  are the stock-market  effects  operating  through  house- 
hold balance  sheets  relative  to those operating  through  investment?  The 
MPS model  uses one prominent  investment  approach  in which  the stock 
market  affects  investment  demand  through  the rental  cost of capital.  Table 
9 contains  estimates  of direct  stock-market  effects derived  from simula- 
tions with the MPS investment  sector in which stock-market  effects are 
suppressed  by setting  the real value of stocks at trend  levels.49  A com- 
48.  Ibid. 
49.  This procedure is used because it is consistent with the earlier stock-market 
simulations. Here it is assumed  that to freeze out stock-market  effects, the real value 
of stocks should be set at trend values regardless  of dividend  changes. The dividend- Frederic S. Mishkin  159 
Table 9.  Direct, Partial Stock-Market Effects on Business 
Fixed Investment,  1973:1-1975:3 
Predicted  change  in demand  in billions of 1958 dollars 
Investment  in  Investment  in 
Year  and  producers'  durable  nonresidential 
quarter  equipment  construction  Total  effects 
1973:1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
3  -0.  1  -0.2  -0.3 
4  -0.3  -0.5  -0.8 
1974:1  -0.7  -1.0  -1.7 
2  -1.4  -1.6  -3.0 
3  -2.3  -2.5  -4.8 
4  -3.5  -3.7  -7.2 
1975:1  -5.1  -5.2  -10.3 
2  -7.2  -6.4  -13.6 
3  -9.7  -7.1  -16.8 
Source: Results from dynamic simulation experiments starting in 1973:1 using MPS investment sector 
in which the real value of stock is set at trend values and is used to calculate the dividend-price  ratio. The 
third column is the sum of the first two. 
parison  of these effects  with those of table 8 indicates  that the household 
balance-sheet  channels  are far more important  than  investment  channels 
in the transmission  of stock-market  effects  on the economy.  In the trough 
quarter  1975:  1, the household  effects  were  over  three  times  the business- 
investment  effects,  which  are  very  slow in responding  because  of the long 
lag structure  in the  investment  equations. 
The full MPS  model,  with additional  equations  for balance-sheet  items 
and  for consumption  expenditures  and  housing,  is used in experiments  to 
estimate  the general-equilibrium  stock-market  effects.50  The stock-market 
effects  on the full system,  operating  both  through  investment  and  balance- 
sheet  channels  (given  in table 10), build  up to $56.5 billion  by the begin- 
ning  of 1975, indicating  that  about  half  of the falloff  in aggregate  demand 
price ratio is then calculated using these trend values. An alternative  procedure  is to 
freeze out stock-market  effects by fixing the dividend-price  ratio at the 1972:4 value. 
This alternative  does not yield very different  results: by 1975:1, stock-market  effects 
are $1.3 billion smaller in absolute value than those of table 9. 
50. Adding equations  for balance-sheet  items allows for the induced  stock-market 
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Table  10. Full-System  Stock-Market  Effects  on Aggregate  Demand, 
and Recession  Gap,  1973:1-1975:3 
Billions of 1958 dollars 
Predicted  change  in demand 
Personal  Business  Total 
Year  and  consumption  Housing  fixed  Total  recession 
quarter  expenditures  expenditures investment  GNP  gap 
1973:1  -0.5  -0.  1  0.0  -0.5  10.5 
2  -2.4  -0.8  -0.2  -3.1  7.0 
3  -5.7  -1.9  -0.8  -8.3  2.2 
4  -9.5  -3.1  -2.0  -15.0  -1.1 
1974:1  -14.1  -4.2  -3.8  -22.9  -24.6 
2  -18.4  -5.1  -6.3  -30.8  -36.5 
3  -23.5  -6.0  -9.2  -39.5  -49.0 
4  -28.8  -6.9  -12.8  -49.1  -76.7 
1975:1  -31.8  -6.4  -16.8  -56.5  -109.4 
2  -32.4  -4.5  -20.0  -58.1  -114.6 
3  -30.5  -2.5  -21.8  -52.6  -98.7 
Source:  Results from dynamic simulation experiments starting in  1973:1 using the balance-sheet con- 
sumption expenditures  and housing models and the full MPS model, with additional equations for balance- 
sheet items. All equations have residual adjustments. This table gives estimates of the difference between 
a control simulation and a simulation in which the real value of stocks is set at trend levels. Detailed 
procedures are available from the author on request. 
in the 1973-75 recession  can be attributed  to the decline in the stock 
market  from  trend.51 
The full-system  simulated  effects  from  the stock-market  decline  can be 
viewed in a slightly  different  light. How differently  would aggregate  de- 
mand  have behaved  in this recession  if the stock market  had had no ad- 
verse influence?  In figure  5, the course  of real GNP (unrevised  data in 
1958 dollars  as discussed  in note 2)  in this counterfactual  case is com- 
pared  to the actual  movements  in GNP.  With  no stock-market  effects,  real 
GNP reaches  its peak value three  quarters  later, and the peak-to-trough 
decline  in real GNP is less than  half as severe  as it was in fact. Not only 
would  the recession  have  been  of average  severity-the percentage  decline 
peak  to trough  would  have  been  comparable  with  those  in the recessions  of 
1953-54 and 1957-58-but  by the third  quarter  of 1975 real  GNP  would 
51. The  stock-market effects estimated above are twice those that Bosworth 
found, primarily  because he does not include possible liquidity balance-sheet  effects 
in his experiments.  Also, because Bosworth  sets the dividend-price  ratio at its 1972:4 
value in his simulations, the real value of stocks can fall below trend;  this results in 
an understatement  of stock-market  effects operating through the household balance 
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Figure 5.  Comparison  of Simulated Path of Real GNP with No Stock- 
Market Effects and Path of Actual Real GNP, 1973:1-1975:3 
Billiors of  1958 dollars 
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Sources: Simulation results of  table 10, column 4, and  U.S.  Department of Commerce data before 
the 1976 revisions of the national income accounts. 
have approached  its previous  peak  value.  In fact, in the absence  of stock- 
market  effects,  the economic  downturn  would  have been far closer  to the 
mild  setback  that  forecasters  and  policymakers  were  expecting. 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted  to show that changes in the household 
balance  sheet, which were principally  the result of the worst decline in 
prices of common stock in the postwar  era, were important  depressive 
forces  in the economy.  A substantial  proportion  of the decline  in aggregate 
demand  can be attributed  to shifts in the aggregate  household  balance 
sheet  and  the  depressive  effect  of the  stock  market  on investment. 
Could  macroeconomic  policy, and in particular  monetary  policy, have 
been used to soften  the severity  of this recession?  The answer  appears  to 
be "yes."  Besides the traditional  influence  monetary  policy has on the 162  Brookings PaDers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
economy  through  interest  rates,  it can  affect  aggregate  demand  through  the 
stock market.  Much theoretical  and empirical  research  indicates  a link 
between  monetary  policy  and  the valuation  of common  stocks.52  Adoption 
of a more expansionary  monetary  policy by the Federal  Reserve  Board, 
which  would  have  raised  the rate of money  growth,  might  have alleviated 
some of the severity  of the downturn.  Knowledge  of possible  household 
balance-sheet  effects on aggregate  demand might have convinced the 
monetary  authority  that financial  forces operating  through  stock-market 
effects were extremely  depressive,  and thus that a more expansionary 
policy  was  appropriate. 
One moral  that emerges  from  the analysis  presented  here is that  infor- 
mation  on the balance-sheet  positions  of American  households  should  be 
used in constructing  stabilization  policies. Furthermore,  policymakers 
should analyze a wider range of monetary  phenomena  beyond interest 
rates  and  the stock  of money  before  embarking  on certain  policy  paths.  In 
particular,  movements  in prices of common  stock should  be studied  be- 
cause  of their  possibly  potent  effects  on aggregate  demand. 
APPENDIX 
Variables  and Data Sources 
THE  FOLLOWING variables  from  the MPS data  bank  have been described 
in the text: CON, EXPCD, K0C, N, PCD, PCON, R, STK, W, and YD. 
Variables from other sources 
D = depreciation  rate =  0.02 for single-family  housing, 
0.025 for multifamily  housing,  and  0.20 for consumer 
durables. 
DEBT = MPS household-liabilities  measure,  supplied  by the 
Board of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System. 
52.  See Sprinkel,  Money and Stock Prices, pp. 115-42; Tobin, "A General Equi- 
librium Approach to Monetary Theory"; Modigliani, "Monetary Policy and Con- 
sumption";  Duncan K. Foley and Miguel Sidrauski,  Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a 
Growing Economy (Macmillan, 1971), pp. 9-85; Richard  V. L. Cooper, "Efficient 
Capital Markets and the Quantity Theory of Money," Journal of Finance, vol. 29 
(June 1974),  pp. 887-908;  Michael S. Rozeff, "Money and Stock Prices: Market 
Efficiency and the Lag in Effect of  Monetary Policy," Journal of Financial Eco- 
nomics, vol. 1 (September 1974), pp. 245-302. Frederic  S. Mishkin  163 
For the housing equation a mortgage series con- 
structed  from seasonally adjusted  Federal Reserve 
flow-of-funds  data was subtracted.  All the debt mea- 
sures  were deflated  by PCON. 
FIN = MPS financial-assets  measure  supplied  by the Board 
of Governors  of the Federal Reserve System. The 
housing equations  include the real stock of single- 
family housing,  minus  the mortgage  series described 
under  DEBT. The FIN measures  were all deflated  by 
PCON. 
HH =  U.S. households.  Annual  data  are  available  from  U.S. 
Bureau of  the Census, Current Population Reports, 
P-20, "Population  Characteristics."  Quarterly  inter- 
polations  were made using marriage  data from U.S. 
Department  of Health,  Education,  and  Welfare,  Vital 
Statistics of the United States, vol. 3, "Marriage and 
Divorce." 
HS8  and  HSM  =  single-family  and multifamily  housing  starts,  respec- 
tively.  The variables  were  constructed  in the following 
manner: 
1. From U.S. Bureau of the Census, Construction 
Reports, C20, "Housing  Starts,"  monthly  data were 
obtained  on the number  of housing  starts  in buildings 
with one, two, three to four, and five or more units. 
These were seasonally  adjusted  (with the X- 11 pro- 
gram) and  compacted  to quarterly  totals. 
2.  From U.S. Bureau of the Census, Construction 
Reports,  C40, "Housing  Authorized  by Building  Per- 
mits and Public Contracts,"  data were obtained on 
the average  value per permit  in permit-issuing  areas. 
These were blown up using Census estimates  of the 
appropriate  factors  to give average  value per start  in 
permit areas. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Con- 
struction  Reports,  C30-70S,  "Value  of New Construc- 
tion  Put  in Place, 1958 to 1970,"  p. 69. 
3.  Construction Reports, C20, provided the division 
of starts between permit and nonpermit  areas. For 
single-family  units, the Census Bureau provided an 
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$6,010 +  0.34 times the average  value per start in 
permit  areas.  For units  in multifamily  structures,  non- 
permit  values  were  assumed  to be 85 percent  of permit 
values. See Construction Reports, C30-70S, p. 69. 
4.  Average  values per start, permit and nonpermit, 
were then multiplied  by their respective  number  of 
starts  by start  class. Values  of multifamily  starts  were 
the sum  of the values  for units  other  than  single-family 
dwellings. 
5.  The  data  were  then  deflated  by PH. 
K8  and  Km  single-family  and multifamily  housing  stock, respec- 
tively.  These  variables  were  constructed  by using  data 
on the real value of housing starts (HS2 and HSM) 
and using weights  from H. J. Cassidy  and J. Valen- 
tini, "A Quarterly  Econometric  Model of the U.S. 
Housing, Mortgage and Deposit Markets" (paper 
presented  at the  winter  meetings  of the  American  Real 
Estate  and  Urban  Economics  Association,  1972;  pro- 
cessed), to get completions,  blowing  completions  up 
by a factor  of 1.0581, and then using  this series  with 
a perpetual-inventory  method  with depreciation  rates 
of 2 percent  for single-family  houses and 2.5 percent 
for multifamily  houses. 
PH =  Census  price deflator  for single-family  houses. From 
U.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Construction Reports, 
C30, "Value  of New Construction  Put in Place." 
Yp=  expected  real average  (permanent)  income.  This was 
constructed  from the MPS data bank series on real 
disposable  income deflated  by households (HH)  or 
population  (N),  using the procedure  in Michael R. 
Darby,  "The  Allocation  of Transitory  Income  Among 
Consumers'  Assets," American  Economic  Reviev, 
vol. 62 (December  1972), pp. 939-40, with  the quar- 
terly adjustment  coefficient  assumed  to be 0.1 as in 
Darby. 
Y7 =  current  disposable  income minus  permanent  income 
= YD-Y Comments  and 
Discussion 
Robert  J. Gordon:  Mishkin  presents  convincing  evidence  that equations 
containing  only income and (in the case of durables)  the cost of capital 
cannot  explain  the collapse  of consumer  spending  in the 1973-75 reces- 
sion. It is claimed  that  the explanation  that  is missing  from  such  equations 
rests on "changes  in the household  balance  sheet,"  which  constituted  an 
important  channel through  which "depressive  forces" operated  on the 
economy.  A further  conclusion  is that  macroeconomic  policy, and  in par- 
ticular  monetary  policy, could "have  been used to soften the severity  of 
this recession." 
At one level this pair of conclusions  represents  common knowledge 
and simply repeats the core of the current  macroeconomic  consensus 
taught  to many of our students  for a decade or more. The second con- 
clusion-that  monetary  policy can influence  consumption  through  real 
wealth effects-has  been accepted  as a theoretical  proposition  by most 
economists  for more than thirty years. The first conclusion-that  real 
balance-sheet  effects  matter  empirically-seems old hat to aficionados  of 
the MPS model, which has attempted  to trace  the channels  of monetary 
policy not only through  the cost-of-capital  variable-already included 
in Mishkin's  "straw  man"  equations-but also through  the direct  and in- 
direct  effects  of the stock  market  on desired  spending. 
The most striking  piece of evidence  that  Mishkin's  equations  reinforce 
the MPS stock-market  results,  rather  than introducing  new channels  of 
monetary  influence,  is apparent  in table 8. The partial  effects  of the stock 
market  on household  demand (personal  consumption  expenditures  and 
new housing) exceed the total balance-sheet  effects  during  most of 1974 
and 1975. That result holds up even when Mishkin  allows for induced 
effects  of the stock market  on other  balance-sheet  items (column 5).  It 
165 166  Brookinas  Paner.v nn  Economic  Activitv.  1:1977 
raises a puzzle: Why do the balance-sheet  effects  other than those from 
the stock market  work  in the wrong  direction?  Why is the stock market 
more  than the whole of the total balance-sheet  effect? 
Thus this paper  really  is focused  on the effect  of the stock market  on 
consumption  and expenditures  on single-family  housing. And it raises 
important  questions  that  bear  on its main  conclusions: 
1.  What  explains  the paradox  that  balance-sheet  effects  arising  outside 
the stock market  don't  matter  much and in some cases work  perversely? 
2.  Can one distinguish  among  three candidates  as causes of the col- 
lapse  in the stock  market  and  hence of expenditures  on consumption  and 
single-family  housing:  (a) monetary  policy,  Mishkin's  implicit  candidate; 
(b) unanticipated  inflation,  due to the supply-shock  and termination-of- 
controls  effects  documented  in my paper;  or (c) mysterious  lack-of-confi- 
dence  or animal-spirits  effects,  due perhaps  to inflation  or even to Water- 
gate?  Retrospective  judgment  on the wisdom  of monetary  policy during 
the recession  is sensitive  to the choice among  these interpretations. 
The inconsistency  between  the in-sample  statistical  significance  of bal- 
ance-sheet  effects  apart  from those of the stock  market  and the postsam- 
ple perverse  effects observed  in table 8 is partially  a reflection  of the 
reduction  in real debt  brought  about  by double-digit  inflation.  Instead  of 
growing  at the trend  rate  of 4.1 percent  used in the control  solution,  real 
household  liabilities  decline  during  much  of the simulation  period-hence 
the large  positive  entries  in column  2 of table 8. The one piece of good 
news for households  was that inflation  lightened  their real debt burden, 
and that, according  to Mishkin, bolstered their sagging expenditures. 
But the other side of the inflationary  coin was a big negative  impact  on 
the real value of nonstock  financial  assets.  The depressive  effects  on ag- 
gregate  demand  through  that channel  show up in column 3 of table 8. 
These are quite modest relative  to the stock-market  effects, which re- 
flected  both inflation  and  the sharp  fall in nominal  stock  prices. 
The paper  raises  a related  puzzle:  Why  do the coefficients  on nonsotck 
wealth in the third column of table 4 show up as insignificant  in the 
equations  for durables  and single-family  housing?  How could one form 
of real  wealth  matter  a lot while the other  form  mattered  not at all? The 
only sensible  interpretation  I can suggest  is that there is no independent 
real-wealth  effect,  but rather  a "real  confidence"  effect.  Imagine  the fol- 
lowing  example.  Currently,  1 percent  of all households  plan  to buy a new 
car  this  month,  1 percent  the next  month,  and  so on. Now let the nation  be Frederic S. Mishkin  167 
shocked by an unexpected  event-say,  an announcement  by President 
Carter  that he plans  to grow a beard,  thus leading  to a loss of consumer 
confidence  as the President's  mental stability is  called into question. 
Instantly,  the stock market  incorporates  the news and declines;  simul- 
taneously,  spending  plans  are  revised  downward,  so that  in each  successive 
future  month  only 0.9 percent  of all households  plan to buy a new car. 
Mishkin's  equation  for durables  will estimate  a nice distributed-lag  rela- 
tion between  spending  on durables  and  the previous  behavior  of the stock 
market,  but the relationship  is not one of cause and  effect.  Both the stock 
market  and spending  have reacted to a third variable,  the President's 
announcement. 
The "confidence"  or "animal  spirits"  interpretation  of the stock-market 
coefficients  makes me skeptical  of Mishkin's  policy conclusion-that  a 
more  expansive  monetary  policy could  have eliminated  the balance-sheet 
impact  on consumption  by lifting  stock  prices.  An alternative  and  equally 
plausible  interpretation  is that stock  prices  went down  in 1974 in tandem 
with the unanticipated  burst  of double-digit  inflation,  and that more ex- 
pansive  monetary  policy would  have both raised  current  inflation  and  in- 
creased expectations  of future inflation, further depressing  the stock 
market  and  the consumer  alike. 
One line of defense for Mishkin  might be the robust coefficient  on 
the debt variable  in table 4, supporting  a genuine  financial-assets  effect. 
Two problems  can be raised here. First, real debt can be moved by a 
change  in either  nominal  debt or the price  level. To what  extent  does the 
real-debt  variable  measure  the impact  of major  changes  in the price  level 
and hence in the relationship  between inflation  and saving behavior  to 
which  Juster  has called attention  on previous  occasions?  Second,  there  is 
the problem  of reverse  causation  which  potentially  may be more serious. 
Durable  expenditures  rely on borrowed  funds. Thus the consumer  has a 
relatively  low level of indebtedness  immediately  before buying  an auto- 
mobile  and a high level immediately  afterward.  The negative  correlation 
between  previous indebtedness  and  current purchases  would occur  auto- 
matically  for any purchase  financed  by borrowing  even if the level of 
indebtedness  played  no causal  role. 
My final comment concerns table 1, the tests of alternative  credit- 
availability  measures  in equations  for the real  value  of single-family  hous- 
ing starts.  All of the proxies  for the credit-rationing  effect  appear  in table 
1 with  low levels of statistical  significance.  This is the most genuinely  sur- 168  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
prising  result  of the paper  and conflicts  with the MPS-type  conventional 
wisdom  regardingr  disintermediation  and housing  expenditure.  Since any 
eyeball inspection  of the charts  in Business Conditions  Digest covering 
saving  inflows  and housing  starts  reveals an extremely  strong  relation,  I 
cannot  believe that Mishkin's  table 1 tells the entire  story. One possible 
explanation  of the  insignificant  availability  coefficients  might  be the failure 
to allow distributed  lags between  saving  inflows  and  the subsequent  effect 
on housing  starts.  Another  might  be the long sample  period,  going back 
to the 1950s. I conjecture  that  similar  regressions  estimated  to the 1960- 
76 period  and  allowing  for distributed  lags  would  reveal  strong  availability 
effects.  In light of the widespread  closing of the loan windows  at many 
savings  institutions  in the summer  and fall of 1974, can we really  believe 
that  consumers  were  on their  demand  curve  for housing  in that  episode? 
Saul  H. Hymans:  It is very  easy to begin  this discussion  of Frederic  Mish- 
kin's paper.  My overall  impression  is that it is an excellent  one. Having 
said that,  I will, of course,  manage  a bit of carping  criticism.  But first,  let 
me indicate  why I think  so highly  of this paper. 
Mishkin  has produced  a model of careful  and competent  econometric 
research  on a topic of central importance  to macroeconomic  analysis. 
The models are formulated  with due attention  to economic  theory and 
the available  literature.  Care  is taken  with the selection  and  processing  of 
data  prior  to the fitting  of equations.  Parameters  are  estimated  with allow- 
ances  for the underlying  stochastic  properties  of the equations.  A number 
of the likely objections  to the specifications  adopted  are anticipated  and 
given a fair  chance;  they fail to reject  the adopted  specifications  and are, 
rather,  pretty  well dominated  by the latter.  Finally, the accepted  model 
is put through  its paces in simulations  that  try  to shed  some  light  on what 
happened  to the economy  in the 1973-75 period. 
By 1974:4  consumer  durable  expenditures  were  some  $25 billion (1958 
prices) below their  peak in 1973:1, and  the simulation  experiments  indi- 
cate that about  half of that drop  can be attributed  to the worsening  of the 
consumer's  balance-sheet  position  beginning  in 1973. On a more  inclusive 
basis, by the first  quarter  of 1975 the sum of personal  consumption  and 
single-family  housing  expenditures  was depressed  by $37.6 billion (1958 
prices) as a direct  result  of the worsening  of the consumer's  balance-sheet 
position beginning  in 1973. The latter actually  exceeds the $33 billion 
(1958 prices) drop  in expenditure  that a further  simulation  attributes  to Frederic S. Mishkin  169 
the shortfall  in consumer  income beginning  in 1973. These are strong 
implications  and  it seems  that  they  must  be taken  seriously. 
Let me turn  to some worrisome  matters  now, without  meaning  to de- 
tract  from  the substantial  accomplishments  of the paper.  I find  it difficult 
to dismiss  altogether  the possibility  that  the stock  market  may  be telling  us 
as much about the consumer's  willingness  to spend-that  is, consumer 
sentiment-as it is about  the consumer's  ability  to spend.  It is well known 
that stock-market  developments  are an important  predictor  of the index 
of consumer  sentiment,  and one could plausibly  infer that the power of 
the stock  variable  derives  partly  from  its being  a proxy  for consumer  sen- 
timent. The paper provides conflicting  indirect  evidence on this issue. 
Consumer  sentiment  is best  predicted  by roughly  contemporaneous  move- 
ments in the stock market,  not by a long distributed  lag on stock prices. 
Yet the distributed  lag is generally  a bit stronger  in Mishkin's  equations 
than an unlagged  measure  of stock  holdings,  a point  in favor  of the wealth 
interpretation.  Further,  if the stock variable  is, in part, a proxy  for con- 
sumer  sentiment,  there  would  be little  reason  to expect  stock  and  nonstock 
wealth  to have the same  effect  on consumer  spending;  yet Mishkin  is un- 
able to reject  this "assets  constraint."  On the other hand, the equations 
for durables  fail to produce  a significantly  nonzero  coefficient  on nonstock 
wealth  in the absence  of the assets  constraint,  and the durables  equation 
is the very one in which  consumer  sentiment  is most likely to play a role. 
Mishkin  indicates  that the consumption  equation  rejects  consumer  senti- 
ment  in the presence  of the wealth  variables,  but he makes  no mention  of 
any direct  test of the sentiment  variable  as a substitute  for wealth  in con- 
nection  with the durables  equation.  And for what  it's worth,  a plot of the 
time series  of the consumer  sentiment  index  looks very much  like the net 
worth series in figure 1 and the durables  expenditure  series in figure  3. 
Although  this issue worries  me a bit, I am beginning  to feel that  perhaps 
we had better  stop blaming  the stock market  for its correlation  with the 
index of consumer  sentiment.  After all, the theory  supporting  the wealth 
effect  on aggregate  demand  is very  compelling. 
For the rest  of my comments,  then,  let me beg this spurious-correlation 
problem  and  grant  that the stock  variable  has its primary  role as a wealth 
component-even though my conviction  on the matter  hasn't  quite the 
purity  of driven  snow,  much  less Ivory  Snow. 
Some time ago I investigated  the effects of wealth and stock-market 
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no panacea.  At that  time  I suggested  that  the  use of stock-market  variables 
did little  more  than  shift  the dating  of one's  forecast  errors.  I still think  so. 
Although  they  helped  Mishkin  a good deal  with an impressive  postsample 
explanation  of 1973-75, let me remind  you that 1954, 1956, and 1961 
were boom years  for common  stock prices and quite  bad years  for con- 
sumer  durable  expenditures.  Similarly,  1953, 1962, and 1966 were very 
bad years  for common  stock  prices  and  excellent  years  for consumer  dur- 
able purchases.  And in the same vein, I would caution  Mishkin  against 
viewing  the stock-price  index as a reliable  leading  economic  indicator.  In 
my study  of the leading  indicators  (BPEA, 2:1973) I took a special  look 
at the stock-price  component  of the composite  index  of leading  indicators. 
The inference  I drew  was that  stock  prices  were  a major  contributor  to the 
tendency of the composite index to provide false-peak signals. Using 
spectrum-analytic  techniques,  I found that stock prices  displayed  a good 
deal of high-frequency  power  which  had poor coherence  with respect  to 
the less substantial  high-frequency  power  in the general  business  cycle. 
On the other hand, I don't want to push this line of analysis  too far. 
Mishkin's  approach  is that  of estimating  a multivariate  structural  equation 
which derives  from  prior  considerations  of economic  theory.  In that con- 
text, it is somewhat  unfair  to criticize  a single part of such an equation 
for being  unable  to predict  adequately  by itself. Certainly,  the stock mar- 
ket by itself  produces  false  signals;  but  so does  current  income  and  nobody 
is seriously  questioning  the proper  place  of income  in a consumption  equa- 
tion.  If we were  in the  habit  of using  only  balance-sheet  and  price  variables 
in consumption  equations  and it were suggested  that current  income be 
included  as well, someone  would undoubtedly  object that income is no 
panacea:  it just shifts  the dating  of one's  forecast  errors.  And then some- 
one else would come along and invent  some funny  distributed  lag in in- 
come  to filter  out the false  signals. 
Next, how much  better  off are  we as forecasters  knowing  that  balance- 
sheet considerations  are important  if that  leaves  us having  to forecast  the 
balance-sheet  items?  I suspect  we can handle  the forecasting  of various 
debt components  and nonequity  assets,  but what do we do about stock 
prices?  Perhaps  we can benefit  from the finding  that stock prices affect 
consumption  with a distributed  lag, and focus attention  directly  on the 
explanation  of such a smoothed  or filtered  index of stock prices. 
Finally, I wonder  whether  it might  not be possible  to improve  matters 
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that there is mileage  in disaggregating  consumer  durables  into three or 
more categories  and that  nondurables  and services  can also be separated 
profitably.  And speaking  of disaggregation,  I'd feel a bit better  about  my 
conversion  to respectful  agnosticism  if I knew  what  happened  to Mishkin's 
equations  in a pre- and  post-1965 split of the sample  period.  Barry  Bos- 
worth,  in his paper  on the stock  market  (BPEA, 2:1975), found  some  sig- 
nificant  differences  according  to whether  the data period included the 
post-1965 experience.  This test might  be as strong and revealing  as the 
specification  tests  that  Mishkin  ran  on his fixed  sample  period. 
None of us who have ever hesitated  to buy another  big-ticket  item on 
credit can really deny that balance-sheet  items ought to matter. And 
people do "take  gas"  when the stock market  plunges,  and  buy haciendas 
with swimming  pools when stock values climb.  The real issue has always 
been whether  these effects  are of aggregative  importance  and  how best to 
measure  them.  Despite  the qualms  already  expressed,  I suggest  that  Mish- 
kin has made  an important  contribution  to our knowledge  about  whether 
and how the consumer's  balance  sheet affects  the aggregate  economy. 
Frederic  S. Mishkin:  Both Gordon  and Hymans  raise  the possibility  that 
stock-market  effects are just proxies for consumer  sentiment  or, alter- 
natively,  for the appearance  of new, unexpected  information  that affects 
consumer  behavior  and the stock market  simultaneously.  One hint that 
stock-market  effects  stem  from  balance-sheet  considerations  and are thus 
structural  is the finding  of a significant  coefficient  on the debt variable  in 
consumer  durables  and housing  equations.  The existence  of debt effects 
cannot  be explained  away  by Gordon's  suggestion  that the debt variable 
may be a proxy for inflation  effects, since unanticipated  inflation  leads 
to lower  real  indebtedness;  this implies  a positive  debt coefficient  if infla- 
tion has a depressive  effect  on consumer  expenditure,  as in Juster's  view, 
rather  than the negative coefficient  implied  by the liquidity  hypothesis. 
Nor can  debt  be a proxy  for a stock-adjustment  effect,  since  a lagged  stock 
term  that  captures  this  effect  is included  in both the housing  and  consumer 
durables  equations,  and yet the debt variable  still retains  its significant 
coefficient. 
Both Gordon  and Hymans  mention  the results  on nonstock  assets in 
the consumer  durables  and  housing  equations-one to support  and  one to 
question  the existence  of balance-sheet  effects on these sectors. In fact, 
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on the basis of my statistical  results.  The small  variation  of the nonstock- 
assets  variable,  possibly  a result  of the procedure  for measuring  this vari- 
able, leads to a large standard  error  of the variable's  coefficient  which 
does not allow  much  distinction  among  competing  hypotheses. 
General  Discussion 
Several  panel  members  joined  Gordon  and  Hymans  in suggesting  that 
the stock-market  variable  in Mishkin's  equations  might be acting as a 
proxy for other,  omitted,  variables.  Benjamin  Friedman,  Michael  Wach- 
ter, and Thomas  Juster  all felt that the estimated  marginal  propensity  to 
consume  out of equities  was implausibly  high, given the degree  of con- 
centration  of U.S. stock-market  holdings.  Friedman  noted  that  most equi- 
ties either are held by the very rich, whose consumption  behavior  is not 
likely to be closely tied to wealth,  or are owned indirectly  through  pen- 
sion funds  and insurance  companies,  where  they are similarly  unlikely  to 
exert  much  influence  on consumption.  He suggested  that Mishkin  has to 
rely on too few consumers  to explain  the changes  in consumer  durable 
purchases  by changes  in stock-market  wealth. Mishkin  responded  that 
concentration  of stock-market  assets  in the hands  of the rich  does not have 
to result in small stock-market  effects. He cited in support the recent 
Friend and Lieberman  cross-section  study  of the effects  of capital  gains, 
and suggested  that,  according  to their  results,  stock-market  effects  might 
be even larger  than those found in this paper.  He argued,  furthermore, 
that in a cross-section  these effects  cannot stem from omitted  variables 
such as consumer  sentiment  or the presence  of new, unexpected  informa- 
tion.  Friedman  also  pointed  out that  the changing  valuation  of the housing 
stock, the largest and most widely distributed  component of private 
wealth,  is not  reflected  in the  wealth  total  used  by Mishkin. 
Juster  argued  that  "animal  spirits"-in this case,  feelings  of uncertainty 
about  future  income-were the most important  determinant  of consumer 
durable purchases.  He reported  that an equation using the consumer 
sentiment  index tracked  the 1973-75 period  extremely  well. Mishkin  re- 
plied that when he had tried a consumer  sentiment  variable  in both the 
housing and consumer  durable  equations,  it was rarely significant  and 
had not changed  the estimates  of the stock-market  effects.  He observed 
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sumption  behavior  by examining  the consumer  sentiment  variable.  Both 
his theory,  which  incorporates  the fear of financial  distress,  and the life- 
cycle theory,  which  is based on expected  lifetime  income,  allowed  a role 
for consumer  sentiment. 
Christopher  Sims found it inappropriate  to try to choose between a 
stock-market  variable  and a consumer-sentiment  variable  on the basis of 
how well they track  movements  in expenditure  components.  What  really 
matters  is whether  a balance-sheet  relation  like Mishkin's  is identifiable 
and  stable  under  variations  in policy.  This could  be true  even if consumer 
sentiment,  via another  relation  in the system,  tracked  expenditures  very 
well. On the other  hand,  no level of tracking  performance  is good enough 
to guarantee  that Mishkin's  relations are reliably identified.  Both the 
balance-sheet  situation  and consumer  sentiment  are endogenously  deter- 
mined.  The crucial  question  is whether  the endogenous  variables  are re- 
lated  in a reliable  fashion,  regardless  of what  things  change.  Sims  felt that 
this element  dictated  great  care  in the choice of instruments  to correct  for 
simultaneity  bias, and he called  for explicit  tests of the exogeneity  of the 
instrumental  variables  Mishkin  had  used. 
George  Perry  observed  that,  since  the stock  market  is the major  source 
of short-run  changes  in wealth,  the criticisms  of Mishkin's  use of the stock- 
market  variable  really apply to all consumption  equations  that use net 
wealth-even  if they do not separate  the stock-market  component.  Mish- 
kin agreed  and stressed  that the data on assets other than stocks, which 
were calculated  from flow-of-funds  data, exhibited  little short-run  varia- 
bility since revaluations  are ignored,  thus making  it difficult  to obtain 
precise  estimates  of nonstock-asset  effects  in equations  for consumer  dur- 
ables  and  housing.  They  had therefore  been constrained  to have the same 
coefficient  as the stock-market  assets. Franco Modigliani  said that the 
constraint  that the marginal  propensities  to consume from all types of 
wealth be equal had been imposed on the original MPS consumption 
equation  because, at the time, it had been incorrectly  thought  that the 
life-cycle approach  did not allow for differences  among income classes 
in consumption  behavior.  Later extensions  of the theory  recognized  the 
bequest  motive  as a source  of such  differences.  Hence, if the stock  market 
assets are owned disproportionately  by higher-income  households,  the 
marginal  propensity  to consume  out of equities  might  well be lower than 
that  out of other  wealth. 
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link betweenl  monetary  policy and stock-market  prices.  The full implica- 
tion of Mishkin's  policy  discussion  was that  the Federal  Reserve  ought  to 
engage  in open market  operations  in equities-a  policy recommendation 
that Modigliani  suggested  might well be worth consideration.  Mishkin 
stated  that he did not intend  to imply a mechanistic  link between  mone- 
tary policy and stock-market  prices, especially because the effect of 
monetary  policy on stock prices is critically  dependent  on expectations 
as to Federal  Reserve  actions.  These considerations  might  make control 
of common stock prices through  open market  operations  an extremely 
tricky  task. 
Some improvements  in the specifications  of the equations  were sug- 
gested.  Goldfeld  remarked  that,  in recent  years,  the widespread  provision 
of overdraft  facilities  might  have reduced  the necessity  to liquidate  dura- 
bles in times  of consumer  distress.  He urged  that  this effect  be tested  and, 
if important,  taken into account.  Juster  suggested  adjusting  the stock of 
consumer  liabilities  for the trend  toward  longer  contract  maturities  since 
Mishkin's  theory  is really based upon the size of the flow of consumer 
commitments.  Juster  also preferred  that  the variables  be expressed  in per 
household  rather  than  per  capita  terms. 